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ABSTRACT
The research in this study was conducted to explore the influence that the Bergen
County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of
all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter
situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is
mandatory for children to the age of 16 in New Jersey it becomes imperative that the
police departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the
police officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while
children are in attendance.
The survey used in the study was sent to all municipal police departments in
Bergen County, New Jersey (N = 68). Voluntary participation was requested from the
administrators of each police department.
This study can be described as cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental
research. There were three research questions which guided the study. The researcher
used descriptive statistical methods to address guiding questions one and two. To answer
guiding question three the researcher used Chi-Squared ( ~ 2 statistical
)
analyses. The
analyses were conducted to determine what relationship the independent or predictor
variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn law
enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007) had on
each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to train
others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).
Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first was
between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments and the

number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response
tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total
operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount
of training being done in active-shooter response tactics.
The study has contributed to decision making in the area of police training in
active-shooter tactics and training.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM AND PURPOSE
Introduction
Police departments across the United States have made changes to the way they
will respond to critical-incidents that occur at schools located within their jurisdictions.
The attack at Columbine High School (April 20, 1999) has served as a catalyst for the
changes made by police agencies all over the country. In Bergen County, New Jersey
changes were mandated by a directive, Directive 05-01 Active-Shooter Policy Initiative,
from the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office in a memo dated April 11,2005 (see
Appendix A). The memo clearly states that as of its distribution, it will become the
policy of the county to have a unified and consistent active-shooter response policy. This
policy, entitled the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter
Situations, was developed by and a final version was agreed upon by the Chiefs of Police

at their February 24, 2005 Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association meeting, and
became mandatory training for all sworn police officers in the county. Also contained in
the directive was a completion of training date of September 1,2005 for all sworn police
officers in the county.
The basis for this type of county-wide response policy is in the understanding of
the Chiefs of Police and other members of the law enforcement community in Bergen
County that critical incidents are likely to produce multi-agency responses. Thls
understanding includes critical incidents that occur in jurisdictions of small to mid-sized
police departments throughout the county, and will most likely require the use of mutualaid from neighboring municipal, county, state, and federal agencies to bring the event[s]

to a resolution. Therefore, when police officers of different agencies are working
together toward the successful resolution of a critical incident, they need to be trained in
similar tactics. For police officers from multiple agencies to work safely and swiftly
together in a critical-incident response they need the same basic awareness of tactics.
Experts agree that violence in schools has become more of a problem since the
late 1990s (Peterson & O'Neal, 2002). Society is increasingly exposed to violence and
police officers must respond to more and different types of violent situations. One type
of situation that is sadly becoming more common is the active-shooter in schools.
Routine-activities theory by Kautt and Roncek (2007) reveals schools as criminal
hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and criminal
activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors (Kautt & Roncek,
2007). Active-shooters are not limited to education institutions; they are just as common
in the work place and in other venues. Police must develop policies and tactics fluid and
flexible enough that they may be employed in diverse locations.
As a first-responder to an active shooting in a school, police must quickly assess
and react to events taking place. To do this, police first-responders must have training in
making assessments and formulating plans to enter schools and save lives. After the
development of the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter
Situations by the Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association, and distribution of this

policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, police officers in Bergen County will
now respond to a critical incident like an active-shooter situation in a school setting in a
unified manner.

Although the terminology appears in the definition of terms section, it is fitting to
define this phrase now that has been coined by law-enforcement professionals and that is
used often in this analysis. The phrase is "Active-Shooter." An active-shooter is defined
as a suspect[s] whose activity is immediately causing death and serious injury. The
activity is not contained and there is an immediate risk of death or serious injury to
potential victims (Borelli, 2005).
Background
Prior to the mid 1960s, police responded and resolved many types of potentially
violent situations. These situations created a need for change in police tactics. The
catalyst for this change was the deadly event at The University of Texas (August 1,
1966), where Charles Whitman killed 15 people and wounded 31 others from the top of a
clock tower. After this event, the modern Special Weapons And Tactics teams were born
(Borelli, 2005). These new and specially trained groups of police officers responded to
critical incidents of active-shooters in the process of killing innocent people; suspects
barricading themselves into dangerous situations, and hostage takers holding innocent
people captive. The new teams were trained in tactics that allowed for the successful
resolution of these situations.
Police officers not assigned to these specialized response teams were now being
trained to respond and secure the scene to allow time to pass when specialized teams
could respond. Time was considered the ally of the police to calm situations and allow
for the response of special teams and negotiators who came along.
Police departments everywhere again received a wake up call on April 20, 1999 in
Littleton, CO. The lesson that day was that the days of police responding to an incident

and waiting for S.W.A.T. to arrive were no longer acceptable when a violent actor was
already taking lives. The police tactic of buying time was not a viable strategy against an
actor[s] who had no intention of surrendering (Egan, 1999). A goal of the actors at
Columbine High School was not to get out alive, as is frequently the case with this kind
of event. In an active-shooter situation, suicide is often a part of the plan from the start
(Scanlon, 2001).
Police have now modified their assessment of what is expected by firstresponding police officers to a critical or violent incident at a school. The new ideas are
now taught in police academies all over the country that police are to respond, assess,
plan, and engage. Allowing time to pass is the opposite of what responding police
officers should do because violent events do not typically last more than 5 to 7 minutes
(Wood, 2001). Calculating the average number of people shot during these activeshooting situations and the typical duration of the shooting, shows that once the shooting
starts, someone is shot every 15 seconds (Tactical Response, 2008). If responses are
divided into 15-second intervals, it is easy to see why police first-responders must not
wait to take action to stop the killing.
Statement of the Problem
Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy
and only now has begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of information available
on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a). Although violent crime
in schools and in general has been on the decline since the early 1990's (Kleck, 1999)
police agencies must adapt to changing societal trends where violent critical incidents are
becoming more common. In this adaptation, society should expect police officers to

respond to violent situations and resolve the issues they are confronted by. One such
issue is the active-shooter situation in a school, which is the foundation of this study.

In this study the researcher attempts to determine if police officers in Bergen
County are adequately prepared to respond and resolve an active-shooter incident in a
school quickly.
Purpose of the Study
The researcher's purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the
Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future
preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to
active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in
schools is mandatory for the children of New Jersey it becomes imperative that the police
departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the police
officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while children
are in attendance.
Guiding Questions
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding

to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?
Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model

policy?

Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers

designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being
done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
Significance of the Study
Up to this point, the literature in this field has presented an incomplete view of
police response to shootings, active-shooters, and critical incidents in schools. Much of
the literature and most studies this researcher has located on the topic are from the
perspective of the school administrators' response to these situations, attempts at
psychological profiles of the shooters and how the media interprets these events.
Therefore, what can be uncovered from a study of this kind can assist police
administrators in their preparation efforts to combat instances of dangerous and deadly
violent situations at schools to better maintain a safer learning environment in the schools
of Bergen County, NJ. As education administrators make the school facilities available
for police training, police become better prepared to respond to crisis situations in
schools.
Most police departments in Bergen County, New Jersey are similar in their
command structure. At the top, the chain of command has a Chief of Police or civilian
Police Director. Outside the internal command, each police department operates under
some direction by the county prosecutor's office, as the county prosecutor is the chief
law-enforcement officer appointed by the governor for that county. Although staffing
and area distinguish one police department from one another they are alike in many ways.
How they differ in their preparedness to respond to an active-shooter situation is the
foundation of this study.

Many different methods are available to train for critical-incident responses, and
experts in the field have not identified one method as better than any other. Each method
is similar in its make-up and basic goal - respond and save lives by confronting and
stopping the violent actor.
Delimitations of the Study
This study was designed to explore what police departments in one county
(Bergen) in New Jersey are doing to prepare themselves better for a critical-incident
response at a school after the distribution of, the Standardization of Patrol Based
Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's
Office. The delimitations of the study were: only the 68 municipal police agencies in
Bergen County, NJ listed on the Bergen County Prosecutors office website were included
in the population (N=68), information to answer the guiding questions was derived from
the survey instrument provided to the Chiefs of Police the Civilian Police Directors or
their designees, the agencies provided with the survey instrument were also asked to
return the completed instrument in three weeks.
Limitations of the Study
Limitations identify potential weaknesses in the study that derive from the design
and methods of a study. The scope of this study focuses on the 68 municipal police
departments in Bergen County, New Jersey. All 68 municipal police departments were
included on the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office website. Since all municipal police
departments in the county were included as participants, the research methodology can be
considered a census. The number of agencies that return the completed survey
instrument is a limitation of the study. The survey instrument used to solicit data was

modeled after the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey. The survey instrument,
along with original questions related to active-shooter preparation prepared by the
researcher was reviewed by a jury of experts in the field.
Since this study is focused on one county in the state of New Jersey which has a
total of 21 counties, the results of the study may not be indicative of the level of
preparations by the police departments in the rest of the state. Therefore, any conclusions
drawn from the study to apply to other municipal departments in the other counties,
county or state police departments, are the responsibility of the reader.
Another limitation of this study is that it is primarily focused on police response
to active-shooter and critical incidents in primary, middle, and secondary schools.
Although some mention is made of events that occur[ed] on college campuses, the study
is limited to how police are responding to the school incidents. College and university
active-shooter and critical incidents are mentioned to establish for the reader some key
events that were either a catalyst for change or an especially violent incident where police
had responded in the same manner as they would have to a lower grade level school.
A section on higher education or college campus violence would not be practical
in this study, as it would need its own study to truly report valuable information. Higher
education institutions are not considered to be schools in terms of law enforcement,
because the student body is comprised of adults. In addition many colleges and
universities have their own police departments or security agencies and these agencies
report to the FBI's Uniform Crime Report differently than a police department within a
countylstate as per the Clery Act for reporting campus crime. The law enforcement

agencies of state and private institutions may fall under the jurisdiction of the state
attorney general's office rather than the county prosecutor's office. This too would
eliminate campuses from the scope of this project as the present study is focused on
municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As a result it would not be
appropriate for the researcher to draw conclusions about the training and preparations of
campus police agencies when they work under different authority than those at the
foundation of this study.
Definitions of Terms
The following are definitions that are relevant to this study:
Active-shooter: "A suspect(s) activity is immediately causing death and serious
bodily injury. The activity is not contained and there is a risk of death or serious bodily
injury to potential victims" (Borelli, 2005, p 2.).
Active-Shooter Team (AST): A team of three or four armed police officers tasked
with finding and stopping an active-shooter.
Critical incidents: terrorist activities, hostage taking, mass causality events, highrisk repetitive crimes, riots, or bombings
Jurisdiction: The territorial range of authority or control.
Police Officer: Any sworn member of a state, county, citylmunicipal police
department empowered to uphold law and order with the power to arrest offenders for
crimes, misdemeanors, and infractions of law.
S. W.A.T. team: A team of police officers trained in Special Weapons And Tactics,
equipped to respond to a variety of dangerous situations.

Organization of the Study
Chapter I has presented an introduction of the problem behind the study, a
background, a statement of the problem, a purpose of the study, guiding questions,
significance of the study, delimitations of the study, limitations of the study, definitions
of terms, and a description of the organization of the study. Chapter 11 presents a review
of pertinent literature, research and theory whlch contains; an introduction, background, a
historical summary of events, traditional police tactics, legal mandates for change, new
police tactics, problems with the new tactics, related research and theory to police
administrators, school violence, a theoretical framework, and a summary. In Chapter 111
the researcher describes the design and methods of the study by discussing; purpose,
design, population, methods, instrumentation, and a conclusion. Chapter IV presents the
collected data and the analysis of the data collected by frequency distributions and Chi-

)
analyses. Chapter V includes a summary of findings, discussion,
Square ( ~ 2statistical
and conclusions and recommendations for policy, practice and future research.

Chapter I1
REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE, RESEARCH AND THEORY
Introduction
The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County
Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all
sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter
situations in their jurisdictions. This chapter presents a review of necessary adaptations
police agencies, both in New Jersey and the United States have made to allow them to
respond to critical incidents in school settings effectively, tactically and efficiently.
These adaptations were based on the education the law enforcement community received
from studying the events of April 20, 1999 at Columbine High School in Littleton,
Colorado as well as from studying other critical incidents around the country. Although
the shooting at Columbine was not the first time a United States school had been the
scene of a deadly attack by either a student or an adult, it did however, have a lasting
effect on the law enforcement community. The attack effectively showed law
enforcement professionals that they were not adequately prepared to respond to this type
of situation and to gain control quickly.
Until the Virginia Tech massacre (April 16,2007) where 33 people were killed
and another 30 were injured (Shapira & Jackman 2007), the Columbine High School
incident was the most deadly shooting to take place in a school setting in the United
States, with 15 fatalities (Egan, 1999). The Columbine High School incident forever
changed how the law enforcement community will plan for, train for, and react to a
critical incident. In light of such an eye opening for U.S. law enforcement, police tactics

have been revised and have been adapted to allow police to respond more appropriately
to a critical incident of this nature. These new tactics lend themselves for a response not
only in a school setting, but in the work place, a private home, a night club or other venue
that may come under attack by a would be killer.

In chapter I1 the researcher reviews the history of the formation of police tactics
and what event was instrumental to the establishment of these traditional tactics. The
analysis addresses school settings including the Columbine High School tragedy, which
served as the catalyst for changes in tactical responses by police departments all over the
country. Historical events are an important component of this review because they show
how traditional police tactics to respond to critical incidents began, how they changed
and how they were sometimes inadequate. An understanding of what police response
tactics were is vital to understand how and why they need to evolve to be more effective.
The researcher then provides a description of traditional police response tactics,
why they are in need of revision and what these revisions include. Developing an
understanding of what the traditional tactics of police response were helps the readers
gain insight into why they have become ineffective in many situations. The researcher
next discusses legal mandates for change at the local, state and federal levels. A
description of the new police tactics to respond to critical incidents demonstrates how
police react to critical situations, in a post-Columbine era. An indepth description of
these new tactics, some dubbed Active-Shooter Response or critical incident response,
suggest the path the law enforcement community has followed to update and make
responses more tactically sound to respond rapidly and save more lives. Columbine and
other school settings have shown the need for cooperation among agencies in critical

incidents. The school backdrop remains a main theme in the present study because tax
dollars are used to fund both police and educational institutions. Because children are
required to go to school they become potential targets at the very institutions where their
attendance is mandatory.
The review then turns toward training, with a focus on the benefits of training for
preparedness and providing police officers with the necessary skills to complete their
mission to save lives. The problems associated with training police officers with the new
critical incident response tactics are explored. Some of these difficulties are getting
police officers to act like tactical teams and focusing on what is most important; the
mission at hand.
Related research and theory as they relate to both police and school violence are
discussed. Numerous theories and studies are critiqued as they form the foundation of
police response and why school violence happens and if there are effective indicators as
to who is committing it.
The analysis contains a summary followed by a section in which the researcher
describes how the evolution of these new tactics should progress so that police can
continue to be effective and relevant to our rapidly changing and ever more violent
society. If police are going to be challenged with resolving these types of critical
incidents they need training, training and more training.
The effectiveness of these new response tactics is crucial for police to be able to
protect the lives of children who are mandated to attend school, and the safety of all
citizens in all types of venues. Therefore an analysis of where police tactics were and
where they are going to be in the future is important to maintain the safety of our society.

Without periodic reviews of how police are preparing for their jobs, in an ever changing
society, the police become stagnate and ineffective. A review of response plans,
strategies and tactics allows for changes to be made for police to become more proficient
in their job performance. As more police agencies are exposed to these situations the
more the law enforcement community has the opportunity to study how to resolve the
situations in the safest manner.
Research and theory are presented through the use of relevant articles, studies,
professional journals, legal mandates, periodicals and books, as well as first hand
knowledge of the researcher and others, to provide the basis for this analysis.
Background
Until the mid 1960s all situations that required a response within a police
department's jurisdiction were handled by the department's patrol-first responders. This
meant that the "ordinary police officer" on a beat was called to handle whatever
happened while the officer was on duty. All calls for police service, such as drunk and
disorderly people to domestic violence to robberies and shootings, were taken care of by
the patrol squad on the street.
This changed on August 1, 1966 in Austin, Texas. Events on this date served as a
catalyst for change in American policing practices at the time. On August 1, 1966,
Charles Whitman, trained to shoot by the United States Marine Corps, forced entry into a
clock tower building at the University of Texas. In tote with him were three rifles, two
handguns, a shotgun and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Oddly enough he also
brought with him a five gallon bucket of drinking water and some sandwiches. He had
obviously planned to be there for some time (Borelli, 2005).

From the top of the clock tower, Whitman killed 15 people and wound 3 1 others,
some as far as two blocks away. Prior to his assault on the university he had also killed
his mother and wife. The first two responding police officers on the scene at the
university, who incidentally just happened to be on campus, teamed with other
responding police and a civilian and made a brave move to launch their own assault.
This ad hoc team advanced on the tower from an underground passage and made their
way inside to confront Whitman. Armed with handguns and a shotgun the team was able
to draw Whitman's fire so he stopped shooting at innocent people on the campus. In the
gun battle that followed, the team killed Whitman and ended his killing spree (Borelli,
2005).
As with most critical or serious incidents that law enforcement professionals face,
there were both a debriefing and a subsequent study of the scene as well as the outcome.
Debriefings and studies of events are tools used to tweak tactics to make them more
effective in the future. This incident was no different. The University of Texas shooting
showed law enforcement personnel that there was a need for highly skilled professionals
to handle these types of situations in the future. The team of officers who came on scene
was courageous enough to take the battle to the killer, hut all situations like this may not
be handled in as brave a manner. Law enforcement professionals who reviewed the
incident concluded there was a need for tactically minded police officers to be specially
trained and equipped to handle a variety of situations. Born out of this incident were the
modem Special Weapons And Tactics teams, known as S.W.A.T. teams (Borelli, 2005).
Since the early 1970's, S.W.A.T. teams and similar teams with their own
interesting and unique monikers like Emergency Services Unit (ESU) and Emergency

Response Team (ERT) began to he formed in police departments all over the country.

This was also a time when military veterans were returning from the Vietnam Conflict
and there was an abundance of tactically trained and battle tested young men to form
tactical teams (Borelli, 2005). The term "men" is used here because at the time policing
in the United States was a maledominated profession. In 1971 after the end Vietnam
Conflict, only 1.4% of all police officers in the United States were women (Home, 2006).
Decades later females became more of a factor in law enforcement. Females in policing
by 2006 made up about 13 - 14% of sworn law enforcement officers in the US (Home,
2006).
The newly formed professional teams were tasked with responding to various
types of critical incidents. Team members became the experts on responding and
handling situations, although not in every agency were these professionals assigned to
this task exclusively. Most team members were assigned full-time to other areas of
policing and to the special team on a part-time basis. From the 1970s to the 1990s special
teams were called upon to handle situations that were above and beyond the capabilities
of patrol-first responders.
In the decade, from 1996 to 2006 there have been at least 80 incidents where guns
were either brought to schools to take hostages, or kill students andlor teachers and
principals in the United States (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). Until April
2007 on the campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute (more commonly known as
Virginia Tech or VT) in Blacksburg, VA, the most deadly assault on a school was at
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999 (Shapira & Jackrnan 2007). The
result of this incident was 12 students and one teacher dead, at least 24 wounded and two

killers who committed suicide (Borelli, 2005). The Columbine High School tragedy took
the breath away from the American public. Not because they had not seen school
violence before. They certainly had, in the 3 years prior to the Columbine tragedy there
were at least 16 school violence incidences, most of which ended with deadly
consequences (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). However, this incident
highlighted the vulnerability of schools and campuses around the country.
What America saw the day of the Columbine High School tragedy, live via the
news media on scene, were police agencies and their officers respond to the school
campus and secure a perimeter. Some estimates are that approximately 120 police
officers responded to the scene (Shepard, 2006). None of the responding police
immediately entered the building to confront and/or stop the killing of students and a
teacher. Why did some of the 120 armed police officers

a enter a building where lives

were being taken by two high school students?
Was this what was expected of police agencies, to sit and wait for a safe situation
to enter? In fact it was. The S.W.A.T. era had brought new policies for police responses.
Police officers were no longer being taught to act on and take care of every situation as
they had in the past. At one point in time the police were the last line of defense, now the
police called on their S.W.A.T. teams to be their last line of defense.
Historical Summary of Events
According to the School Violence Resource Center (2007) and an Infoplease
(2008) internet document, the attacks described in Table 1, were carried out or were
planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack at
Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police response

to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to intervene in
the implementation of a planned attack. Table 2 is a compilation or frequency
distribution of occurrences listed in Table 1 by state.
Klein (2005) asserted that popular discourse addressed school shootings almost
obsessively, but continued to omit the role gender plays in these crimes. New research
has suggested that this omission was ignoring a key element: a significant number of the
boys' own stated reasons for this violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence
specifically involving girls (Klein, 2005). A review of Table 1 shows the absence of
absolutes in the events. It is important to note a quote from George Santayana, that
"those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p.
13). Therefore, similar events need to be positioned together to he able to form a
complete picture of what could happen at any time.
Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the event on
October 4,2002 in San Antonio, TX describes a female actor. Most attacks occurred
inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms; however, some
occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The events took place
in urban, suburban, and rural settings across all socio-economic strata. When seen
through the lens of masculinity theory, the killings of girls who had rejected assailants
can be explained as an effort to reverse the feelings of subordination and inadequacy the
assailants experienced as a result of being rejected (Klein, 2005). Victims were teachers,
students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors in the events ranged
from children (6 years old) to adults.

Table 1

School Violence Incidents, 1999-2008, - Requiring a Police Response to a Private
Residence or School, Either to Thwart an Attack in Progress or Intervene in the
Implementarion of a Planned Attack
1. April 20, 1999: Littleton, CO. Two boys, ages 16 and 17, shoot 35 students and 1
teacher before committing suicide. Twelve students and 1 teacher die.
2. May 13, 1999: Port Huron, MI. Two 14 year-olds plotted to kill at least 154
people at school in an attempt to outdo the shooting at Columbine High School.
They were stopped when fellow students reported them.
3. May 20, 1999: Conyers GA. A 15 year old wounds six classmates.
4. October 28, 1999: Cleveland, OH. A 14 year old and three 15 year olds planned
on killing mostly black students, then die in a shoot out with police. The plot was
reported by a parent.
5. November 19, 1999: Deming, NM. A 12 year old shoots a classmate in the head.
The victim died the following day.
6. December 6, 1999: Fort Gibson, OK. A 71h grade student brings a handgun to
school and opens fire. Four students are wounded.
7. January 29,2000: Cupertino, CA. A 19 year old planned to attack his high school
with guns and explosives. He took photos of himself and his arsenal of weapons.
When the photos were developed the drugstore clerk called the police.
8. February 29,2000: Mount Morris Township, MI. A 6 year old boy brings a .32
caliber semi auto handgun to school and kills a first grader.
9. March 10, 2000: Savannah, GA. Two students killed by a 19 year old student
while leaving a high school dance.
10. May 11,2000: Prairie Grove, AR. A 13 year old seventh grade student who left
the Prairie Grove Junior High in a fit of rage and a police officer were wounded
after shooting each other in a hay field north of the school.
11. May 18,2000: Millbrae, CA. A 17 year old with a history of threatening other
students with guns was reported to officials by fellow students when he threatened
to do a "Columhine" type shooting.
12. May 26,2000: Lake Worth, FL. A 13 year old sent home from school returned
with a handgun and kills a teacher.

13. September 26, 2000: New Orleans, LA. A student fought with another student,
went home, returned with a gun, and killed the student he fought with earlier.
14. October 24, 2000: Glendale, AZ. A teenager held a teacher and 32 students
hostage for an hour before surrendering.
15. January 10,2001: Oxnard, CA. A 17 year old entered school and took a girl
hostage in an attempt to commit "suicide by cop." After S.W.A.T. arrived he was
shot dead.
16. January 17,2001: Baltimore, MD. A student was shot and killed in front of Lake
Clifton Eastern High School.
17. February 5,2001: Hoyt, KS. Three students, ages 16, 17, and 18 planned to do a
school shooting. An anonymous caller reported the boys to the police using a tip
line. When the homes of the three were searched police found guns, bombs and
white supremacist drawings.
18. February 7,2001: Fort Collins, CO. A 14 year old and two 15 year olds plot to
"redo Columbine." Several classmates alerted the police after overhearing them
talking about it.
19. February 11,2001: Palm Harbor, FL. A 14 year built a bomb having a kill radius
of 15 feet. The parents of another student alerted police of the bomber's plans.
20. February 14,2001: Elmira, NY. A high school student's plans for a school
shooting were foiled after students brought the fact that he had weapons on him to
the attention of the teacher. He carried 14 pipe bombs, 3 smaller bombs, a
propane tank, a sawed off shotgun, and a .22 caliber pistol into the school by a
duffel bag and also a book bag full of ammunition.
21. March 5,2001: Santee, CA. A 15 year old opens fire from inside a school
bathroom shooting 15 and killing 2.
22. March 7,2001: Twentynine Palms, CA. Two 17 year old boys were arrested after
police were tipped off by another student about a planned attack of their high
school. A search of the boys' homes revealed a gun in one home and a plan in the
other.
23. March 7,2001: Williamsport, PA. A 14 year old brings his father's handgun to
school and shoots a classmate in the shoulder.
24. March 22,2001: El Cajon, CA. Three teens and two teachers were wounded at
Granite Hills High School by gunfire.

25. March 30,2001: Gary, IN. A student was shot in the head while waiting for class
to begin.
26. January 15,2002: New York, NY. A teenager wounded two students at Martin
Luther King Jr. High School.
27. October 4,2002: San Antonio, TX. A 13 year old female middle school student
fatally shot herself in the temple with a hadgun in the parking lot in front of a
group of friends.
28. November 19,2002: Hoover, AL. Two 17 year old males were reportedly
fighting in a hallway when one student pulled a knife and stabbed the other to
death.
29. November 22,2002: Dallas, TX. A 15 year old male student was shot as he and
fellow students try to wrestle a gun from another 14 year old student.
30. December 12, 2002: Seattle, WA. A 13 year old male fired a rifle in a middle
school, injuring two students with broken glass, and then used the gun to kill
himself.
31. December 16,2002: Chicago, IL. An 18 year old male high school student was
fatally shot outside of Englewood High School, while trying to protect his sister
from two other male students.
32. January 22,2003: Providence, RI. A 1 2 ' ~grade student was arrested for firing a
.22 caliber gun inside the school's cafeteria after an assistant principal broke up a
fight.
33. January 27,2003: Cresent, OK. Three eighth grade middle school students were
arrested for allegedly carrying pipe bombs into their school.
34. January 30,2003: St. Paul, MN. A 14 year old middle school student was stabbed
in the shoulder. Two teenage males were arrested for the incident.
35. January- 30.2003:
Jenks. OK. A 17 vear old male student armed with a 9 mm
.
handgun climbed onto the roof of the school's gym and threatened suicide. The
student also had pointed the gun at an assistant principal.
36. February 5,2003: Westminster, CO. After several shots being fired in a high
school courtyard, a 14 year old student was taken into custody.
37. March 1I, 2003: Gilbert, AZ. Six youths were identified by police as plotting to
do a "Columbine-style massacre" at their high school. Police and school officials
found notes and plans for bombs as well as other violent plans.

38. March 17,2003: Guttenberg, IA. A 17 year old walked into his high school
principal's office to thank the principal for listening to his problems. The boy
then pulled a rifle out of his coat and shot himself in the stomach.
39. March 21,2003: Lawndale, CA. Two teenage high school males were arrested
after police learned of a list the two had with names of students and teachers who
were targets. An unfinished pipe bomb and directions to make the bomb
downloaded from the internet were found in one of their homes.
40. April 1,2003: Washington, DC. A 16 year old male high school student was shot
in the leg during a lunch time argument with another student.
41. April 16,2003: Addison, TX. A 12 year old student committed suicide by
shooting herself in a private school bathroom.
42. April 23,2003: Houston, TX. A 16 year old male student received a 7 inch slash
across the chest in a fight outside his high school during lunch period.
43. April 24,2003: Red Lion, PA. A 14 year old junior high student shot and killed
the principal inside a crowded cafeteria then killed himself with a second gun.
44. May 23,2003: Texas City, TX. A bomb was found in the home of a 16 year old
high school student who had plans to kill the school districts' chief of police.
45. September 18,2003: Atlanta, GA. A 14 year old Lovejoy High School student
was arrested after police said he planned a "Columbine-style massacre" at his
school.
46. September 24,2003: Cold Spring, MN. One student dead and another injured
after a shooting in the high school. A teacher was able to talk the shooter into
surrendering.
47. August 14,2003: Columbus, GA. A 14 year old girl went back to her middle
school to visit old teachers. A fight broke out behind the school. As a crowd
gathered one of the boys fighting took out a gun and started to shoot. The girl
was killed.
48. August 30,2004: Maywood, IL. A 22 year old waiting to pick up his younger
brother was shot and killed in a high school parking lot in an apparent gang
related crime.
49. September 14,2004: Memphis, TN. A 15 year old male was killed in a gang
initiation "jump in" fight in a school bathroom that got out of hand.

50. October 7,2004: Newburyport, MA. A 15 year old male high school student shot
and killed himself outside of his high school. A result of an argument with a
female student.
51. November 17,2004: Hempstead, NY. A 17 year old was stabbed to death blocks
from school in a lunch time gang related fight.
52. November 22,2004: Philadelphia, PA. An 18 year old former student was shot
and killed as two others were injured in a shooting that occurred outside a high
school.
53. November 24,2004: Valparaiso, IN. A 15 year old wielding 2 knives stabbed 7
classmates. No one died.
54. December 10,2004: Nine Mile Falls, WA. A 16 year old student shoots himself
s school. He later died from his wound.
in the head in the entryway of h ~ high
55. March 21, 2005: Red Lake, MN. A 16 year old kills his grandfather and
companion at home, then a teacher, a security guard, 5 other students and himself
at school for a total of 10 dead.
56. August 25, 2006: Essex, VT. A gunman looking for an old girlfriend bursts into
an elementary school and kills a teacher.
57. September 13,2006: Van Nuys, CA. A student is shot and killed in a crosswalk
in front of school in an apparent gang-related crime.
58. September 25, 2006: Las Vegas, NV. After getting off a school bus a student
opened fire at the bus. None of the 34 students on board was injured.
59. September 27, 2006: Bailey, CO. An adult male sexual predator enters a school,
assaults 6 female students, kills a girl trying to flee, then kills self as police make
entry to stop him.
60. September 29,2006: Cazenovia, WI. A 15 year old student, disciplined the day
before, enters school with multiple weapons and shoots the principal.
61. October 2,2006: Nickel Mines, PA. An adult male sexual predator enters a one
room Amish school and kills 6 female students and self.
62. October 9,2006: Joplin, MO. A Columbine copy-cat, a 13 year old male, fires
one round into the ceiling of the school as his gun jams. A teacher talked him into
leaving.

63. October 18,2006: Orlando, FL. In a fight that began in lunch period over a girl, a
15 year old student was stabbed multiple times with a serrated knife. The student
later died.
64. January 3,2007: Tacoma, WA. An 18 year old student shoots 17 students in
hallway of Henry Foss High School
65. October 10,2007: Clevelmd, OH. A 14 year old student at Cleveland High
School shot and injured two students and two teachers before shooting and killing
himself.
66. February 11,2008: Memphis, TN. In a gym class a 17 year old Mitchel High
School student shot and wounded another student.
67. February 12,2008: Oxnard, CA. A 14 year old boy shot a student at Green Junior
High School causing the victim to become brain dead.
(School Violence Resource Center, 2007; Infoplease, 2008)
The researcher assembled Table 1 to highlight what was (and is) happening at
schools all over the country. Cohen and Felson (1979) wrote that several conditions
need to be present for some types of predatory violations to occur. They claim that for a
predatory violation to be successful an offender must possess criminal inclinations and
have the ability to carry out those inclinations, there must be a suitable target, and the
absence of a guardian capable of prevention of the criminal act must also be present
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). Cohen and Felson (1979) continued to assert that the absence
of any one of the conditions described is normally sufficient to prevent predatory
violations. According to Small and Tetrick (2001) students are less likely to be victims
of serious violent and nonfatal crimes at schools than away from them. American
schools are relatively safe places for children to be. Beger (2003) contended that widely
publicized incidents of juvenile violence in public schools have created the public
misconception that such behavior is commonplace. Although there are not deadly violent
acts at schools every day, these examples are an indication of the need for police to be

specially trained to respond to and handle serious assaults and killings on school campus'
around the country. Certain areas are more subject to crime because they have suitable
targets, and offenders subjectively perceive these areas as feasible locations for criminal
acts (Knautt & Roncek, 2007). Columbine became a wake up call for police who need
to be prepared for this type of incident (Associated Press, 1999).
Table 1 does not account for shootings on college campuses. College campuses are
likely to be patrolled by either campus police departments or campus security
departments. Although other police agencies would likely respond to a college campus
during a crisis in a mutual aid capacity, the focus of this research is the municipal police
departments' preparation. Violent situations, active-shooters, or critical incidents on
college campuses would be an excellent topic of a future study or research project.
Table 2 was assembled to reiterate for the reader that there is no one state in the
United States that is more susceptible than another to host violent events in schools or
private residences. Table 2 shows that events are just as likely in rural, suburban, urban,
wealthy, middle-class, and poor areas of the country.

Table 2

Frequency Distribution by State on Events Provided in Table I (April 20, 1999 to
February 2008)
State Freauencv
State Frequency
State Frequency
State Freauency
AL

1

AR

1

AZ

2

CA* 10

CO

4

D.C. **1

FL

3

GA

4

IA

1

IL

2

IN

2

KS

1

LA

1

MA

1

MD

1

MI

2

MN

3

MO

1

NM

1

NV

1

NY

3

,OH

2

OK

3

PA

4

RI

1

TN

2

TX

5

WA

3

WI

1

VT

1

* The city of Oxnard, CA had two reported incidents
** Washington D.C.
Traditional Police Tactics
Prior to the birth of the S.W.A.T. concept, ordinary police officers handled every
situation. The teams would respond to an incident, gather intelligence, formulate a plan
of action and execute the plan. After the arrival of S.W.A.T., patrol officers were taught
they need not be as aggressive and assume the risk of encountering armed gunmen or
assailants: professionals would handle that type of situation (Borelli, 2005). This became
the new and what is referred to from this time on in this study as the "traditional
response," in which the policing personnel were to respond and wait.
Police administrators began to advocate the training of patrol officers in a support
role for the specially trained teams. Police began to train for responding to critical
incidents, setting up perimeters and securing the area for the special response. Patrol's

response edict became to isolate, contain, and negotiate. These methods were used as a
sort of clock-stopping mechanism to buy time for the "specials" to arrive (Baker, 2005).
Present for the Columbine School siege was a School Resource Officer or SRO, a
police officer who is stationed at the school to handle whatever problem that may arise on
campus. Normally, this is the police officer who knows the layout of the school the best
and is most familiar with the school and how to move around in it. While stationed at the
school, this officer should be continuously gathering intelligence about the school, the
teachers, staff, and the students. This intelligence may be used for purpose of detection
and prevention of problems before they arise and deterrence of violent attacks. However,
this officer remained behind cover, safe, while students were still being killed in the
building, rather than to enter and confront the shooters (Kopel, 2006).
The traditional practice of containment of the situation and waiting for S.W.A.T.
to arrive had been in practice since the 1970s. Hostage takers and barricaded suspects
were very adequately handled by securing an area and calling for negotiators to come and
try to resolve the matter. Some events can be controlled by buying extra time and
allowing for reasoning with the aggressor to take place (Scanlon, 2001).
S.W.A.T. tactics are normally slow and deliberate movements made to insure the
safety of the team members. Once a team has made entry into a building or other facility,
members move slowly as a cohesive unit. The team members clear every space they
occupy and pass by before moving on to the next possible threat. The time needed by a
single S.W.A.T. team to clear a building the size of Columbine High School methodically
could be hours. At Columbine, three teams were eventually inserted into the building.

However, if there is an active-shooter, who is seriously wounding andlor killing
people, the first responding officers need to make a rapid assessment of the incident and
make entry to stop the suspect[s] (Scanlon, 2001). The breakdown of the traditional-style
police response at Columbine was that the first arriving officers responded, but then held
and waited for S.W.A.T. The S.W.A.T. team arrived and began its assessment and
eventual entry into the building. This entry was criticized by some as being too slow and
methodical, which is, incidentally, what these teams are known for, slow and methodical
searches (Egan, 1999).
The shooting in Columbine High School was over in 16 minutes, more than
double the average amount of time these types of situations last, which by some estimates
is between 5 to 7 minutes (Wood, 2001). The first-entry team entered the building at
approximately 46 minutes after the shooting had begun, or 30 minutes after the killing
had stopped. A review of the incident and its many hazards including the multiple bombs
and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) can certainly justify the type of slow
methodical response that S.W.A.T. used (Marx & Mayhood, 2001). However, to
horrified parents or concerned citizens watching the media coverage, the thought
certainly was that the police should go into the school and save the kids inside.
This slow response by a tactical team would be warranted by the information
police were developing about the numerous explosions that had already gone off inside
the school. They were also receiving information about the location of other explosive
devices planted in and around the school and in cars located in the parking lots. Police
were being told by students who escaped the school that there were as many as eight

gunmen in the building, snipers on the roof and gunmen in the ceilings (Associated Press,
1999).
The rule of thumb in most police circles is that the police cannot help anyone if
they are injured themselves. Had the S.W.A.T. team just rushed into the building they
very well may have been the next set of victims in the massacre. Bombs squads had also
responded and begun to make their own evaluations of the scene.
Police, prior to 1999, had been trained to make assessments, gather information,
set up command posts and make the proper notifications. There was no textbook
response for a situation like this one because this was a relatively new type of incident
(Associated Press, 1999). In this case police were just reacting.
For police to begin to deal with this situation effectively other resources were
needed to be requested to handle various parts of the job. Responding units need updated
and timely information on which location is the safest to respond. Officers need to know
the location of the command post so they will know where to report in once on scene.
The one aspect of this response that was glaringly absent was a determination by
someone, a leader, a supervisor, a ranking officer to give the order to make entry to the
facility and confront the shooter[s] to stop the killing of innocent people. This way of
thinking only came as a result of the Columbine tragedy. In the aftermath, the incident
was reviewed and dissected, and in doing so law enforcement professionals realized that
something needed to happen. These traditional police response tactics had been shown to
be ineffective for the Columbine type of crisis. Tactics that police were using needed to
change, was the conclusion recognized on the federal, state and local levels of law
enforcement.

Legal Mandates for Change
Following highly publicized campus shootings law makers have had to make
school safety more of a priority (Beger, 2003). In the wake of Columbine, the United
States government response to the issue of critical incidents in schools and on college
campuses has been to make grant monies available so that school administrators could
work with law enforcement personnel to implement safety programs (Bethel, 2005).
These anti-violence campaigns are useful in prevention and in the education of students
and educators.
Through the many pages and documents this researcher has reviewed to collect
details for the literature review, most of the literature in professional journals on this
topic was found to be directed toward school preparation and response: The law
enforcement element of this topic was not as widely discussed or researched. There
seems to be a failure to address the issue of the successful resolution of a violent andlor
critical incident in a school or on a college campus. Since the Virginia Tech massacre the
federal government made additional monies available for the training and equipping of
campus police officers to respond to critical incidents on campuses.
In January of 2002 the State of New Jersey passed legislation which created a

School Violence Awareness Week. This legislation was intended to make it known that
it is in the public interest of the state to designate a week in October of each year as
"School Violence Awareness Week" to provide students, parents, school district and law
enforcement personnel with an opportunity to discuss methods to keep schools safe from
violence, to create school safety plans, and to recognize those students in need of help.

In Bergen County, New Jersey a directive (Directive 05-01) was distributed to all
Police Chiefs within the county mandating basic training for all active sworn law
enforcement officers employed therein in a uniform and consistent active-shooter
response. This training was required to be completed by September 1, 2005. Bergen
County distributed a model policy to police agencies, to adopt as their own or modify as
necessary to suit the needs of their respective jurisdiction.
Not until July, 2007, did the State of New Jersey follow suit by mandating that all
police departments have and maintain a policy and procedure for an active-shooter
response. This directive created mandatory training of all police recruits in the topic area
of active-shooter response while recruits are engaged in a police academy training
curriculum (NJ Attorney General Directive 2007-01).

In September, 2007, a report, "K-12 School Security Task Force Report" was
presented to New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine. This report discussed the topic of safer
schools throughout the state and concluded with recommendations for a distribution of
model policies on topic areas such as: active-shooter, bomb threats, lockdown, evacuation
and a public information officer (School Security Task Force, 2007). (As of late 2008,
the researcher has not located the model policies to have been distributed).
Progress is being made in school safety. A U.S. Department of Education survey
found that 96% of public schools required visitors to sign in before entering the school
building (National Center for Education Statistics, 1998). According to Garcia (2003) the
good news is that school homicide and violence is down, however the bad news is that
the number of rare multiple victim school shootings had increased in the mid 1990s.

New Police Tactics
Environment is a powerful inhibitor or facilitator of crime and situational
prevention strategies can affect its likelihood of occurrence (Cohen & Felson, 1979;
Weisburd et al., 2006). American schools have had to alter how they do business and
how they protect their students (Harper, 2000).
Active-shooters typically work within a plan they have developed. These plans
arc normally tactically laid out and well developed. These plans typically will include
rmdomly shooting victims, as many as they can, before committing suicide. Not many
of these actors are motivated by "getting out alive" or eventually having their day in
court; suicide is usually a part of the plan (Scanlon, 2001). Time, which had always been
the ally of the responding specialized teams en route to the crisis, is now worlung against
them (Egan, 1999).
The first responding police to the scene of an active-shooter situation are now
responsible for making a rapid assessment of not only all of the previously mentioned
criteria, but now they must decide whether to form up into teams and launch an assault of
their own. This assault goes by many different names. In New Jersey it is called ActiveShooter Response by law enforcement, in Ohio it is called QUAD or Quick Action
Deployment, in other areas of the country it is known as Immediate Action Rapid
Deployment (IARD). Regardless of the name of the deployment tactics, most are nearly
identical in practice. They all are based upon the first responding police officers to a
scene, equipping themselves and forming up into three or four-person teams. These
teams are sometimes known as ASTs, short for Active-Shooter Teams. The officers or

teams then make an entry into the structure or facility that is under attack and as quickly
as possible find the aggressor[s] and stop them.
These types of tactics are situation-dependant though. They are not the answer to
every situation. If the officers are responding to a hank robbery or to a hostage situation,
these tactics are not appropriate. Police rushing into these types of events may cause
more harm than good. Time has always proven to be an asset when dealing with an event
in the absence of gunfire or killing. That being said, if there is shooting going on or if
people are being assaulted or killed the police have a moral obligation to make entry to
try to save innocent lives (Lloyd, 2000).
The premise behind the new system of tactics is quite simple. After an initial
assessment is made and information is provided to the police that there is an activeshooter in a building or facility, the police will enter to locate and stop the shooting. This
is done in a rapid but organized manner and with tactics that have been shown to be
effective. The officers will form into three or four-person teams, preferably the latter. If
they have special equipment, they equip themselves as such. Some special equipment
may include: breaching tools (tools used to open doors and windows forcibly), assault
type rifles /long guns, extra gear such as ballistic helmets and tactical vests that carry
extra handcuffs and magazines loaded with ammunition or first aid equipment.
The team leader - whoever in the group is the most tactically minded or the best
thinker under pressure, regardless of rank - will direct the team to the chosen entry point.
In this regard the mission has the greatest chance for success; ability is put before ego

(Giduck, 2005). Safety is always a concern but speed is important. The team will stack

(a single-file formation) prior to entry into the building and perform a quick gear check to
make sure all team members have what they need. The team then enters the site.
Team members each have specific responsibilities. Once inside a structure the
team spreads out into a diamond formation. The front or first person inside is responsible
for all threats that are ahead of the team. The second person or the right side in the
diamond-style formation covers threats to the right of the group. This is typically the
team leader position. The threats may include windows or doors the group will pass.
The left side or third person will cover all threats to the left. The last or fourth person is
responsible for the rear safety, essentially to protect the group from any threat from the
rear and everything the group has already passed. This position is very difficult for two
reasons; this operator is (a) wallung backward and trying to keep up with members of a
team walking forward at a rapid and stressful pace, and (b) is walking blind into battle
with total reliance on other team members to cover their assignments.
One major difference between this type of entry and a S.W.A.T.-type entry is the
rapid movement past un-cleared areas. S.W.A.T. operators are taught

to pass areas

they have not checked and cleared. An AST will move past everything until they
encounter, confront, and stop the shooter because they are moving to the sound of the
gunfire, or attack.
What makes this group so effective is that they are constantly moving toward the
actor or shooter. The group is directed either by updated intelligence from the command
structure outside the building or by intelligence they have gathered on their own inside
the building. Intelligence inside the building comes from various sources, such as from
students or teachers or employees running away from the source of violence to save

themselves, or from their own eyes, ears, and observations. Either way, the group's plan
is to move to the violent actor, confront him, contain him, stop him, arrest him, or engage
him in battle. There are basically three ways these situations end (a) suicide, (b)
surrender, or (c) termination (Borelli, 2005).
Problems with the New Tactics
These tactics may seem simple when explained in lay terms. The police respond,
assess the situation, and enter to stop the shooter. This sounds like an easy sell to police
officers. However, some parts of these tactics are very difficult to train for. The most
difficult aspect of this is to train the responding police officers that they must pass injured
victims and walking wounded: step over or around them if necessary to meet their
objective.
Yes, pass and leave the wounded: walk right past injured teachers and students
alike. The reason behind this unappealing and certainly unorthodox method of rescue is
to put an end to the shooting quickly. The primary way to reduce the number of potential
victims is to neutralize the shooter (Scanlon, 2001). One bright side to the new tactics is
that the team will communicate the location of the injured and any other available
information to the command post outside. The incident commander will decide to form a
rescue team specifically to retrieve the wounded.
If the inserted police officers who make up the ASTs get tied up with evacuation
efforts, with trying to treat and rescue the injured occupants of the building or by
searching rooms prior to passing, precious time is lost and the shooter is creating more
victims (Scanlon, 2001). A school or workplace could house hundreds of potential
victims. An effective use of the first responders is to install them into the area as

"hunters": they must hunt the aggressor, pass by all others, and focus on their mission to
stop the killing of innocent victims.
Acting as hunters is a difficult concept to train to a group of people who have
sworn to protect the citizens they serve. Most of a municipal police officer's job is
service-related. Police respond to more medical calls then they do to crimes in progress.
Police are accustomed to rendering first aid in a multitude of situations, from aid calls to
car accidents to slip and falls. Medical treatment would come more naturally to most
police officers than acting in a combat capacity.
The thouglit process behind this seemingly violent transition between police
officer and combatant is that people are dying waiting for you, the responding police
officer, to stop the person[s] doing the killing. To accomplish this, police must act more
like a military unit than a municipal police department. They must train to act fast and
with a maximum level of violence in order to take control of a bad situation therefore
saving lives (Giduck, 2005). Police have to be trained to think of these situations more as
a battle ground than a crime scene (Giduck, 2005). During the heat of battle, the focus
must be to stop the enemy by getting to and engaging the enemy quickly to end the
conflict.
The researcher acts as a trainer of these new tactics in a mid-sized municipal
police agency and along with a partner and co-trainer, identifies those police officers in
that agency who should never join the battle. Those that were identified should sooner be
sent to where nothing violent is occurring rather than risk their incompetence getting
brave police officers, willing to risk their own lives to save others, hurt or killed. These
police officers either lack the requisite skills to be a part of an ad hoc tactical team or just

cannot handle the stresses associated with this type of situation. Before the shooting
starts, is the time to take a realistic inventory of what human and material resources are
available to supervisors who will staff the command posts.
School Resource Officer
Many reports on the choice of a School Resource Officer (SRO) call for a
rigorous selection process for those who will be assigned to the schools. It just so
happens that these police officers are typically the first on scene at a school shooting
incident (Fairburn & Grossman, 2000). These police officers are stationed at area
schools and are positioned to be a vital part of a team inserted into a school. They should
have the best knowledge of the layout of the school and may also be able to identify the
actorlstudent doing the killing when only being provided with a name.
An SRO needs to be able to switch into a combat mode at the drop of the hat
because they have trained hard for this very type of situation. Let the teachers do the
teaching at the schools and have the police do the policing. The job of the SRO should
be to continuously be alert, prevent and react. In the absence of prevention they should
be able to switch gears and react to be the front line in the battle, bringing the battle to the
potential killer, whoever it may be (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000).
To provide high quality protection for our children takes training and more
training. The training requires time in the schools practicing for these very types of
events. The training has to include planning for other aspects that go along with critical
incident response, such as setting up perimeters, evacuation routes, staging areas for other
responding services and the like. The agencies that fail to plan for this type of event to

occur in their jurisdictions will have the most difficulty dealing with violence when it
happens. And it could happen anywhere.
One difficulty in training police is that all police executives are not sold on the
costs and benefits of this training. Some police executives have been in policing for
many years. Therefore, it is highly likely that they came into police work with a different
mindset, one devoted to old-style policing where police responded and waited to secure
the area. Justification for spending money on new equipment and training for their police
departments when they had always relied on the local, regional or county S.W.A.T. team
to handle tough situations may be difficult for them. The rationale behind this sentiment
is that S.W.A.T. teams train for critical incidents, so let them handle it. It is their job.
The problem with this mentality is the time that is lost while S.W.A.T. is responding
cannot be reclaimed; as more time goes by more victims are likely to be injured or killed.
As stated in chapter 1, every 15 seconds another victim is shot during an event of this
kind (Tactical Response Staff, 2008) so time cannot be spent waiting.
Research and Theory Related to
Police Administrators
There is an assumption among organization leaders and theorists that structure
influences behavior (Ouchi, 1977). According to Mintzberg (1979) action planning
specifies method and time frames for decisions and actions. Perrow (1986) described
rules that govern conditions of work and specify standard processes for carrying out
tasks, will help to ensure that similar situations are handled uniformly. Bolman and Deal
(2003) stated several of their assumptions of the structural frame; organizations: achieve
established goals and objectives; increase efficiency and enhance performance through

specialization and division of labor; and coordination and control ensure diverse efforts
of individuals and units mesh, through the use of structure.
Mintzberg's (1979) theory of action planning is a clear fit for police preparedness
because it accounts for how the job is done rather than specifically relying on the
outcome of the operation. In the type of police operation at the foundation of this study,
there will not always be positive results. Innocent people will lose their lives as police
move to their target. The police may have to pass by injured people on their way to
achieve their action plan. This tactical decision to save more lives by stopping the
shooter rather than to save the lives of the already injured can be applied to the heart of
Mintzberg's theory. The objective of success is more difficult to measure so it becomes
necessary to assess how the job is done. When innocent people die, it is difficult to call a
mission a success. However, using Mintzberg's action planning theory as a gauge,
persons in a debriefing session could look at the result of the mission: If lives were saved
by stopping the shooting was the mission a success?
The theory of rules discussed by Perrow (1986) can also be applied to police
training. This theory again allows for interoperability of police departments that
normally do not work together. If all agencies are training in the same tactics then the
likelihood of an operation that is jointly undertaken (interoperability) will be successful
greatly increases.
The theories that are a part of the foundation of the structural frame as discussed
in Bolman and Deal (2003) lend themselves rather neatly to the field of policing. Police
officers work under very structured conditions that are rule oriented. In the field of

policing there is a very clear chain of command and the structure of police departments
and their level of preparation will determine the outcome of the situations they face.
The assumptions described by Bolman and Deal (2003) that people in
organizations achieve established goals and objectives can be applied to police training
because there must be a clear and concise plan established to determine what tactics will
be taught. The assumption concerning increased efficiency and enhanced performance
through specialization and division of labor (Bolman & Deal, 2003) applies to police
training for critical-incident response in that specialization and division of labor allows
police to train for specific tasks and excel in their performance. The more successful the
police officer is at their assigned task the more likely the mission will result in success.
To date, most research on school shootings has been conducted by psychologists
who have focused on mental illnesses and problems of the offenders however; little
attention has been paid to the social and cultural contexts of these incidents (Fox &
Harding, 2005). Less attention has been paid to the law enforcement aspect of this
problem. This researcher has found no studies focused on the best method for law
enforcement officers to respond and deal with a school shooting.
School Violence
According to Currie (1985) many theories on juvenile violence were flawed because
they were somehow separate from social policies, inequality, racism, unemployment and
neglect. Currie called the failure to address these other issues the "fallacy of autonomy"
(Currie, 1985, p. 185).

In their general theory of crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) stated that low self
control in the pursuit of self interest causes crime. Their assumption is based on

parenting deficiencies for those that are more likely to express themselves defiantly and
in criminality.
Organizational deviance occurs when events that are created by or in
organizations do not conform to an organization's goals or expectations and produce
unanticipated and harmful outcomes (Vaughan, 1999, p273). After a 2 year study,
O'Toole (1999) concluded that no research exists that has identified traits and
characteristics that can reliably distinguish school shooters from other students.
O'Toole's (1999) study asserted that many studies of school shootings were based
predominantly upon media accounts of the events. These accounts would often be flawed
because the media did not enjoy access to confidential law enforcement and school files
(O'Toole, 1999). O'Toole (1999) identified personality and behavioral traits that many
school shooters possess; although O'Toole stressed that none of the traits should carry
more weight than the other. O'Toole concluded the report with the recommendation that
school and police administrators use threat assessment to thwart possible attacks. A
threat was defined as an expression of intent to do harm or act out violently against some
one or something. The threat can be oral, written or symbolic (O'Toole, 1999).
The U.S. Secret Service (2002b) advocates responsible bystander behavior where
students with knowledge of events or threats should inform responsible adults. This
would allow for problems to be addressed before they end in potential school violence.
Coordination and control help to ensure that diverse efforts of individuals and
units mesh (Bolman & Deal, 2003). This theory is the premise behind having a unified
response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents. Through the use of
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officers from various agencies are able to work safely and effectively
together.
Fox and Harding (2005) studied organizational deviance as a factor of school
violence. According to Fox and Harding (2005) rampage school shootings fit Vaughan's
definition of organizational deviance because the violence deviates from formal design
goals and normative standards or expectations.
Kurtz and Nofziger (2005) stated that using routine-activities theory and or a
lifestyle model to study juvenile exposure to violence is a useful tool. In their study, data
from a nationally representative sample demonstrates that routine-activity of lifestyles
that expose juveniles to violence serve as and important risk factor for juveniles
offending violently (Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). However, Kurtz and Nofziger (2005)
pointed out that many studies of juvenile violence tend to focus on friends, family and
violent juveniles. The gap in the research appears to be that routine activities or lifestyle
create a situation where the juvenile may be an innocent bystander to violent crime
(Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). Juveniles become at risk because of the violence they witness
rather than the violence in which they are a participant.
According to Gottfredson, Gottfredson, Gottfredson and Payne (2005) recent
attempts to prevent serious violent crime in schools have been focused on identifying the
characteristics of the offenders. The study had been undertaken to try to successfully
identify potential shooters before they act (Gottfredson et al., 2005). A more accurate
way to track school violence is to identify the schools with elevated crime rates and
violent incidents (Gottfredson et al., 2005). The basis for this theory is that prior studies
on school characteristics as predictors of deviant or violent behavior have shown that

community characteristics, school structural characteristics along with variables outside
of the control of school administrators are effective predictors of the level of disorder in
schools (Gottfredson et al, 2005).
Optimistic bias (Chapin & Coleman, 2006; Weinstein, 1980) refers to the
perception that bad things happen to other people. Reduction of optimistic bias in regard
to school violence is an important step in creating an understanding in students' personal
risks, getting them to take threats seriously and taking self-protective measures (Chapin
& Coleman, 2006). The Chapin and Coleman (2006) study was the first study of

optimistic bias in the context of school violence. Other studies have used optimistic bias
to study violence in the context of violence against women and child abuse (Chapin &
Coleman, 2006). The validity of direct application of results the study may be
questionable in that it was conducted on a small scale in one county in Pennsylvania.
Policy recommendation for both police and school administrators may require the study
to be replicated on a larger scale.
Routine-activities theory (Kautt & Roncek, 2007) revealed that schools can be
criminal hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and
criminal activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors.
Pies (2007) called for a "distant early warning" system of indicators to identify
troubled students. This can only be done when the full resources of doctors, parents,
schools, and communities are combined to reduce the plague of violence in our culture
(Pies, 2007).
This information is equally as important to school administrators as it is to police
administrators that are trying to understand violence in schools. School administrators

can work toward intervention strategies when armed with knowledge of what types of
students have the potential to he violent and from what set of circumstances they come
from. This is not a be all and end all. There is no crystal ball to predict the future acts of
school violence. School administrators can work toward putting measures in place when
they become aware of students that may be in crisis mode as defined by the numerous
theories previously discussed. The true benefit of a mutual knowledge shared by both
police and school administrators is that information can be shared in a symbiotic
relationship to ensure a safer learning environment for all students.
Theoretical Framework
To establish a strong relationship between the number of police officers trained to
provide active-shooter training to other police officers and the frequency of training
police are doing to be better prepared to respond to active-shooter situations in the
schools and the variables that may have an effect on the training, consideration should be
given to theory and research in the field of study. Theories of organizational structures,
goals, and planning are part of the theoretical framework for the present study.
Organizations are designed to achieve established goals and objectives; increase
efficiency and enhance performance through specialization and division of labor; and
coordination and control ensure diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh, through the
use of structure (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Therefore, when police agencies establish a
structured environment where training, planning and goal setting are stressed the result is
better preparation for critical incident response.
At the foundation of the present study is the Standardization of Patrol Based
Response to Active-Shooter Situations. In this standardization policy, the appropriate

response strategy involves immediate action and quick deployment by patrol forces to
stop deadly actions of criminal actor[s]. For police to delay deployment under these
circumstances may result in additional death or serious injuries (BCPO, 2005).
Summary
Parents and citizens are entitled to have their police agencies, at the municipal,
county, state and federal levels make adaptations to do more to enhance their quality of
life. To accomplish this, these agencies must work hard to prepare for events that have
become all too common in our society. School violence, work place shootings and
potential terrorist activity on US soil is now more than ever a reality.
School safety training and critical-incident drills have become mandated in New
Jersey and other states. As much as had been done to prevent fire deaths in schools,
needs to be done to prevent death at the hands of a violent adult or student in a school.
With fire sprinklers and alarms in every school, and fire drills and evacuation routes
preplanned, the likelihood of a student dying in a fire in a school in the US is minimal at
best. In fact, no child has died in a fire in the last 25 years in an American school.
However in the school year 2004/2005,48 people were killed at the hands of a violent
aggressor in schools (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000).
Training and safety have a long way to go toward prevention of these types of
incidents. In the mean time there has to be more done for police to be able to effectively
minimize the causalities in our nation's schools. School adrmnistrators are more alert and
aware of potential problem students. Schools are being equipped with surveillance
devices to protect the potential victims contained therein. More needs to be done to

prepare for the most likely threat that may come to those in the building. To prepare for
the violent people who are allowed access to the facility.
This has to come from the police and their stepped up efforts of training and
planning for potential attack. With the initiation of tactics such as active-shooter training
and all of its kind, there needs to be a follow through. This will come at the hands of
forward thinking police executives that realize that there is a need for getting their
officers into schools to become more familiar with the interior layouts of the buildings.
Executives that understand that the officers that are assigned to schools in the capacity of
the SRO, are truly the best qualified to thwart or fend off an attack on the school. Police
executives must understand that the time of setting up and waiting for S.W.A.T. is no
longer an option. They need to realize that all of their police officers must be tactically
trained to be able to make a difference. They need to act in spite of any lack of help by
school administrators.

In 2004, a Columbus, Ohio police officer had stopped a deadly attack at a night
club concert. A gunman had entered the club and killed a band member on stage while
he was performing. An alert police officer trained in QUAD, (the Ohio version of activeshooter training) entered the night club, encountered the suspect and shot him dead,
stopping the shooter's deadly assault before any more lives had been taken (Marx &
Mayhood).
In 2005 in Red Lake, Minnesota a 16 year old student killed a grandparent and the

grandparent's companion. The student went to his high school and shot a teacher, a
security guard, and five other students before killing himself. The Red Lake Police
Department had prepared for an event like this and trained for it at the school. They

relied on their training and made immediate entry into the school (School Violence
Resource Center, 2007). Their response time and school entry was 2 minutes. The police
officers found, confronted, shot, and wounded the violent student who then retreated into
a classroom and killed himself (Freed, 2005). Their training had paid off. Although
innocent lives had been lost, many more people could have been killed without the
immediate response by the police.
These two incidents have shown that rapid police response to a scene and
immediate police action will save lives. Violence can happen anywhere and if the police
have not prepared for it there is the potential for many lives to be lost.
This researcher believes plans need to be developed now for all facets of these
critical incidents. Road closure plans, staging areas, triage locations, debriefing sites,
contact lists and the like. During the mayhem of these encounters there is too much to do
to just wing it. Responses may need to be to a degree scripted to get as much essential
work done with a minimum level of thinking about the various contacts that may need to
be made. If a response plan exists some things on scene can become automatic and more
attention can be focused on other areas of concern that may need more attention.
Chapter I1 has presented a review of pertinent literature, research and theory
which contained; an introduction, background, a historical summary of events, traditional
police tactics, legal mandates for change, new police tactics, problems with the new
tactics, related research and theory to police administrators, school violence, a theoretical
framework, and a summary. Chapter 111will include a description of the design and
methods of the study by discussing; purpose, design, population, methods,
instrumentation, and a conclusion.

Chapter I11
DESIGN AND METHODS
Purpose
This chapter provides an overview of purpose, design, methods, population,
instrumentation, and conclusion. The purpose for this study was to explore the influence
that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and
future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response
to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in
schools is mandatory for the children of Bergen County, New Jersey it becomes
imperative that the municipal police departments of the county are able to provide a safe
learning environment while children are in attendance. Bergen County has 68 municipal
police departments that were included as participants in the study. The researcher
obtained a complete list of municipal police departments in Bergen County on the Bergen
County Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net, then added the number of police
officers employed by each municipality with information derived from the FBI's 2006
Uniform Crime Report, New Jersey full-time law enforcement employees (see Appendix
B).
The researcher was guided by the following questions:
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County b rose cut or's
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model
policy?
Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers
designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being
done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
Because there is relatively little research in the field of police tactics and only
some theory, most of which is concerned with the psychological characteristics of the
actor[s], the researcher relied heavily on related literature and the descriptions of prior
events. The study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy and
only now has begun to be seriously studied and therefore, there is a lack of information
available on police training (O'Brien, 2008a). The importance of this study is based in
the knowledge of "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it"
(Santayana, 1905, p. 13).
Design
A survey instrument was assembled to gather information in several topic areas:
descriptive information, personnel, operations, specialized units, emergency preparedness
for Active-Shooter 1 Critical Incident response, equipment, and policies and procedures.
Six of the eight sections of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey
were borrowed with permission (see Appendix C). The survey instrument then
comprised of 58 questions which were assembled to gather descriptive information. A
total of 51 questions were borrowed from the LEMAS survey instrument and 7 original

questions designed by the researcher. Permission was granted via telephonic and email
contact with Dr. Brian Reaves, the lead statistical administrator of the survey for the
Bureau of Justice Statistics. Specifically, Dr. Reaves stated in an email correspondence
that permission was granted to use certain questions from the original LEMAS survey
tool. The original survey instrument was not a copy-written document and was therefore
public domain. However, a request was made from Dr. Reaves that the Bureau of
Justice Statistics not be mentioned in the new survey instrument: a request which was
honored by the researcher.
A pilot study was then conducted to determine face validity of the survey
instrument. Some comments received from the respondents of the pilot study included
that the survey was lengthy and time consuming. See the instrumentation section of this
chapter for more information on the results of the pilot study and specific comments
made by the participants for the revision of the survey instrument.
As a result of the feedback generously provided by the participants of the pilot
study of this project, a total of four questions were used from the original LEMAS survey
instrument. Questions originally designed to gather information about the number of
full time police officers working for a law enforcement agency, total dollar amount in
operating budget of the agency, total dollar amount in seized funds made by the agency,
and total calls for service responded to by the agency. All questions were based on the

2007 calendar year, the last complete year of operation of the agency prior to this study
taking place. After further review of the research tool, the researcher realized the survey
tool distributed in the pilot study gathered a large amount of information that shared little

relevance to this research project. Several of the topic areas previously mentioned were
deleted to comply with the suggestions of the participants of the pilot study.
The remaining eight questions included in the revised survey instrument for this
research project were developed by the researcher in conjunction with a jury of experts.
The final survey instrument used in this study comprised of 11 questions (see Appendix

D). These questions were specifically tailored to provide answers to the guiding
questions of this research project.
The present study is a type 2 design, that Johnson (2001) calls a cross-sectional,
descriptive study. It is cross-sectional because the data are collected from participants at
a single point in time. According to Johnson (2001), if the researcher is describing
phenomenon and documenting the characteristics of phenomenon then the study is
descriptive non-experimental research. The data directly apply to each case at a single
time and comparisons are made across the variables of interest (Johnson, 2001, p. 9).
The present study sought to answer the following questions:
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2.
Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of
Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What

factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train

others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police
departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
This study can be described as a cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental
research by the use of the Johnson (2001) descriptions. According to Witte and Witte
(2004) the present study collected qualitative data because when a single observation is a
word or a code that is representative of a class or category, the data are qualitative. Witte
and Witte (2004) also suggest that descriptive statistics such as tables, graphs and
averages can be used to organize and summarize information about a collection of
observations. The researcher proposed to use descriptive statistical methods to address
guiding questions one and two of this project. Through the use of frequency distributions
the researcher addressed the data gathered from the survey instrument to answer the
guiding questions.
To answer guiding question 3 the researcher used the Chi-Squared (@) statistical
method. Analyses were then conducted to determine what relationship the independent
or predictor variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn
law enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007)
had on each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to
train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).
Methods
This study relied solely on self reported data by agents of police departments.
According to Kerlinger (1986) "It can even be said that non-experimental research is
more important than experimental research.. ." (p. 359). Gall, Borg, and Gall (1996)
stated causal -comparative methods are the easiest quantitative approach to looking into

cause and effect relationships between phenomena. One of the objectives of this study
was to find which of the independent variables discovered in the survey instrument had
the most effect on the type and frequency of training being done in municipal police
departments of Bergen County. Because all of the 68 municipal police departments in
the county were included in the study it was considered a census. The researcher
proposed to have all 68 of the municipal police departments existing in Bergen County,

NJ participate in the study. A letter asking for permission to send each of the police
agencies a survey was sent to the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. The researcher
received a letter from the prosecutor's office granting permission to send the survey to
the municipal police agencies (see Appendix C). In the permission letter was a request
for the researcher to share the findings of this project with the prosecutor's office.
Furthermore, in a follow up phone conversation the researcher had with First Assistant
Prosecutor William Galda, it was made known that this research project stimulated
interest in a topic that had been put aside for a period while other important topics were
being handled. The project sewed as a catalyst for the prosecutor's office to look into all
the policies that municipal police agencies had submitted since the distribution of the
training memo at the foundation of this study. This leads the researcher to conclude that
prior to any data collection this research project has been a useful tool in reigniting
interest in an area that may have been forgotten.
The rationale for soliciting participation from each of the municipal police
departments in the county is in the similarities and differences of the police departments.
Responses to the survey instrument from police departments of varying staffing levels,
economic prowess, and setting (urban 1 suburban) will paint a more accurate picture of

what training is occurring within the county in the realm of active-shooter response. The
primary objective of this study was to determine what influence the Bergen County
Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all
sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter
situations in their jurisdictions. Each identified municipal police department in the
county was sent a survey instrument (N=68) along with completion instructions and a
cover letter requesting the Chief of Police, civilian Police Director or their designee
complete and return the survey to the researcher.
The final survey instrument comprised of 11 fact based questions was sent to a
jury of experts in the field. The experts agreed that the survey was easy to understand,
easy to complete, and took very little time to locate the information to answer the
questions. The original questions borrowed from the LEMAS survey come with a
reported 90% reliability estimate as provided by the lead statistician for the survey, Dr.
Reaves of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The LEMAS survey is distributed to police
agencies across the United States every three years and has been determined to be both a
valid and reliable tool.
All information being requested by the survey is accessible to the researcher
through the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), however it is the contention of the
researcher that in the form of a survey instrument the most current and accurate data will
be collected which will make the resulting information more timely and relevant. If the
researcher were to request all information being sought in this study through OPRA the
information gathered may not be the most current as record updating is not a daily

occurrence in governmental agencies, and this process would add a significant amount of
time to the project as well.
Once the voluntary participant police agencies return the surveys to the researcher
a Cronbach's Alpha test will be conducted to determine a reliability coefficient.
Cronbach's Alpha is a test reliability technique to provide a unique estimate of the
reliability for a given test (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). This will be reported in more detail in
chapter IV.
Prior to mailing the surveys, they will be coded with a control number known
only to the researcher to track the responses as they are returned. No questions will be
asked to specifically identify any agency based on the responses provided by the
participants. No personal or identifying information will be asked of the person or
representative of the police agency that has completed the survey. This is another layer
of anonymity built in to the present study. All surveys as they are returned to the
researcher will be stored in a locked fire resistant safe in the home of the researcher to
maintain the security of the data. This information will be maintained for a period of no
less than three years. The survey is also completely voluntary in nature. The study was
approved by the Seton Hall University Institutional Review board on December 17,2008
(see Appendix C).
Population
All of the police agencies used in this study are located in Bergen County, NJ, and
each falls under the direction of the Bergen County Prosecutor's office jurisdiction.
There are a total of 68 municipal police departments included in the study. Some of the
distinctions of the police agencies are: number of sworn officers, square mileage

patrolled by the agency, equipment, and specialized services available by the agency.
Police departments were approved to participate in this study through a permission letter
approved by the Bergen County Prosecutor, John L. Molinelli. Police departments were
then sent a cover letter with an explanation of the study and survey instrument to
complete and return to the researcher.
Instrumentation
The LEMAS survey instrument was adapted to the specific needs of this research
project. Wording of selected questions was changed to reflect the timeframe under study.
Section V community policing and section VI emergency preparedness which is specific
to terrorist activity were not used. A new section V with original questions formulated by
the researcher along with a jury of experts in the field of policing, emergency
management, and tactics was substituted to help the researcher answer the guiding
questions of this research project. The researcher developed questions which replaced
the original section V of the study and sent them electronically to Dr. David Klinger of
the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department of The University of Missouri - St.
Louis; Dr. Stephen Hoptay, Lieutenant with the New Jersey State Police, Office of
Emergency Management, Special Operations Section; Dr. Daniel Simone, Captain with
the Hohoken (NJ) Police Department; Sergeant David Champerlain of the Modesto (CA)
Police Department, Special Victims Unit; and John Gnagey, Executive Director of the
National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) for feedback. With feedback and expert
advice from the aforementioned experts in the field, questions were developed and
accepted for use in the study.

A pilot study was then conducted on August 1,2008 with the survey instrument in
three municipalities in New Jersey that are in neighhoring counties to Bergen; Morris and
Passaic. In Passaic County the researcher contacted Chief Joseph Borell of the
Bloomingdale Police Department, and Lt. Paul Dring of the Wayne Police Department.

In Morris County the researcher contacted Chief Brian Spring of the Pequannock Police
Department. The aforementioned police departments were selected for the pilot study for
two reasons; (a) they are in neighhoring counties to Bergen, (b) they are a representative
sample of the number of police officers in municipal police departments in Bergen
County. The Bloomingdale Police Department has 16 full-time police officers,
Pequannock has 30, and Wayne has 116. These numbers are very similar to the Bergen
County staffing levels for small, medium and larger sized agencies listed in the 2006 FBI
Uniform Crime Report (FBI, 2006).
Each of these police administrators was provided with the survey instrument and
asked to complete it using the attached directions. They were then asked to contact the
researcher via email as soon as it was completed to provide constructive feedback and
make any necessary revisions or recommendations to make the survey instrument
stronger. The pilot study was conducted from August 1,2008 to August 6,2008.
Chief Borell suggested that the overall appearance of the survey seemed a bit
cluttered and lengthy. Once the Chief began to work on the study, the cluttered feeling
disappeared and the ease of the survey questions became apparent. A comment was
forwarded that the survey seemed a bit too long, with 58 total questions. The Chief stated
the survey instrument was well written and it was clear to the reader what was being
asked. Chief Borell stated the survey took an estimated 45 to 50 minutes to complete.

Chief Borell suggested shortening the survey to include only the information that was
most necessary for the study. With a completion time estimated at approximately 60
minutes, the survey taker may lose interest. Chief Borell made one last comment that was
especially important; the survey should be completed by an agency head. The necessity
of this was born out the type of information being sought, that is budget items, training
hours, and salaries.
Lt. Dring also suggested the survey be completed by a member of the police
department's administrative staff, in the Lieutenant's words, "upper command staff'.
The Lieutenant cited some of same the reasons Chief Borell did for this need. Lt. Dring
stated the survey took approximately 60 to 90 minutes to complete which was even
longer than the time taken by Chief Borell. This estimation was closer to the latter due to
malung several in-house phone calls to gather information that was not immediately
available to the Lieutenant. Lt. Dring also recommended the survey be shortened to
maintain the interest of the participant.
Chief Spring estimated the completion time for the survey at about 90 minutes.
This was consistent with the prior two responses. Chief Spring did not feel as though any
one question was too difficult to answer, and that they were all very clear in what they
were asking. Chief Spring's final comment about the questionnaire was that no revisions
were necessary and all of the questions were clear, concise and relevant but the survey
took a substantial amount of time to complete.
The time to complete the survey was estimated at approximately 60 to 90 minutes
by each of the pilot study participants. This was a duration which seemed to be too long
for each of the participants. Each participant in the pilot study did recommend that an

upper level or command staff member such as the Chief or top administrator complete the
survey as they would have the easiest access to the information requested. The result of
the pilot test was that significant revisions were made.
The survey was pared down from 58 questions to 11 in total. The 11 total
questions were those that would specifically be used to answer the guiding questions of
this research project. The new survey instrument was then sent to four new participants
that agreed to answer the survey and provide feedback. The information gathered from
the new participants, all administrative level police officers; was that the survey was well
written, the questions were clear and concise, the survey took about 10 to 15 minutes to
complete, and the survey should not be an imposition on a police administrator to
participate in the study due to the ease of the completion of the survey instrument.
The final survey instrument coded with a control number was mailed along with a
cover letter of explanation, and a self addressed stamped envelope to facilitate a more
likely return mailing of the completed survey to the researcher. The researcher mailed
the surveys on December 18,2008 and asked the participants to return the 1 1 question
survey by January 7,2009. The researcher allowed a third week for any late mailings
before beginning any statistical processes.
By using frequency distributions the researcher will demonstrate to the reader;
how many police departments in Bergen County, NJ had an active-shooter response plan
in effect prior the training mandate established by the county prosecutor's office, how
many agencies share radio interoperability with neighboring and bordering jurisdictions
since the training mandate, which kinds of equipment purchases were made by police
departments to facilitate forced entry into structures since the mandate, what kind of

training is being done to practice for a future active-shooter event, how many officers
have been trained to instruct other police officers in this type of response tactics, how
often police are training for these kinds of events, how many police departments have
adopted the model policy distributed by the county prosecutor's office or created their
own policy and why. Then the information collected on the number of sworn police
officers, total budget, total in seized funds, and number of calls for service will be used as
variables in a Chi-square ( ~ 2statistical
)
analysis to see which has the most influence on
the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the
frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in
schools in Bergen County, NJ.
Conclusion
In Chapter 111 the researcher described the design and methods of the study by
discussing; purpose, design, population, methods, and instrumentation. Chapter IV will
present the collected data along with an analysis of the data collected by using frequency
distributions and Chi-square ( ~ 2statistical
)
analyses to determine which variables have
the most influence on Active-Shooter preparation being done by police departments in
Bergen County, NJ.

Chapter IV
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Introduction
The researchers' purpose for conducting thls non-experimental study was to
investigate the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had
on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County,
New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions.
The investigation was narrowly focused on answering the following guiding questions:
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? @)
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2.
Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of
Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What

factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train
others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police
departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
Collection of Data
Table 1 provides a list of events complied by the researcher that were carried out
or planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack
at Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police
response to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to

intervene in the implementation of a planned attack. A review of Table 1 shows the
absence of absolutes in the events. It is important to note that "those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p. 13). Therefore,
similar events need to be positioned together to be able to form a complete picture of
what could happen at any time.
Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the example
which occurred on October 4, 2002 in San Antonio, TX, describes a female actor. Most
attacks occurred inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms;
however, some occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The
events took place in urban, suburban and rural settings across all socio-economic strata.
Victims were teachers, students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors
in the events ranged from children (6 years old) to adults.
For this study, a survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of
experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous
flow of back and forth dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts until a
final version was selected. This process was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 111.
This final survey instrument, consisting of 11 questions, was then distributed as a
pilot study for feedback. After the determination that the final 1 1 question survey was to
be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed with permission from the
Bergen County Prosecutor's Office to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen
County, NJ. The mailings took place on December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of
solicitation it was requested that the voluntary participants return the survey to the

researcher by January 7,2009 (see Appendix E). The researcher then allowed for another
7 days for returns to account for the large volume of mail during the holiday season.
In total 68 surveys were mailed on December 18,2008, one to each of the 68
municipal police departments in Bergen County as listed on the Bergen County
Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net. On the January 14,2009 cut off date for
returned surveys, 46 surveys were returned to the researcher resulting in a return rate of
68%. Of the 46 returned surveys, 1 was returned with all of the questions crossed out and
no responses selected with a notation added which read "This causes me concerns on
security issues." Therefore, all descriptive statistics and analyses are based on 45 returns

(N = 45).
Data and Findings
Descriptive Statistics
Survey question l a was designed to learn if, prior to the September 1,2005
mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office for active-shooter response
training, police agencies had a written plan that specified actions to be taken in the event
of an active-shooter in a school. Table 3 indicates that slightly more than half of the
responding police agencies did not have a written plan which specified response actions
to an active-shooter situation in a school of their jurisdiction. Therefore, a mandate to
either develop their own plan or adopt the response plan as distributed was a step in the
right direction toward getting police departments in the country to plan for this type of
critical incident response.

Table 3
Bergen County Police Departments with Response Plan Prior to Prosecutor's Office
Training Mandate of September 1,2005
Response
n
%

Yes
No
Total

21
24
45 (N)

46.7
53.3
100.

Survey question i b provided information on the number of police departments
(21) that indicated they did have a written response plan, and had a mutual aid or
cooperative agreement between neighboring and or geographically bordering
jurisdictions. Table 4 shows that of the 21 police departments that indicated they already
had a response plan prior to the prosecutor's office mandate, 18 had an agreement with
neighboring police departments for mutual aid responses. These results showed that
administrators in police departments that did develop a response plan saw the need to
work cooperatively with neighboring departments.
Table 4
Bergen County Police Departments with Existing Response Plans that have Mutual Aid
Agreements for Joint Responses
Response
n
%

Yes
No
Total

18
3
21

86.
14.
100.
-

Survey question 2 was developed to find out if respondents had, after the
September 1,2005 training mandate, radio communications interoperability with
geographically bordering jurisdictions. Table 5 shows that of the 43 responses to

question number 2,40 police departments did have radio communication interoperability
with geographically bordering jurisdictions. This is another success of the distributed
response model policy. The response model policy created awareness for radio
communications interoperability between agencies that will respond to a crisis together.
Table 5
Radio Communications Interoperability Between Neighboring Police Jurisdictions in
Bergen Countyfollowing Active-Shooter Planning
Response
n
9%

Yes
No
Total

40
3
43

93.
7.
100.

Survey question 3 was created to find out what types of tactical response gear the
police departments of Bergen County either purchased or acquired since the September 1,
2005 mandate. Table 6 indicates the types of response gear and the number of police
departments reporting they acquired the respective items. The table shows that ballistic
shields and carbine or patrol rifles were acquired more than other response gear items.
Table 6
Tactical Response Gear Acquired after Training Mandate of September 1, 2005 (N = 45)
Gear Item
Police Departments that Acquired Gear
%
n
Ballistic Helmets
34
76.
Ballistic Shields
42
93.
Battering Rams
19
42.
Bolt Cutters
29
64.
Carbine or Patrol Rifles
36
80.
Hallagan or Pry Bars
32
71.
Sledge Hammers
24
53.

Survey question 4 provided information on the types of training activities the
respondent police departments participated in to prepare their officers better to respond to
an active-shooter event in a school in their jurisdiction. Table 7 displays which types of
training exercises and the number of agencies that participated in those exercises. The
table includes percentages of Bergen County municipal police departments that
participated at least once in each training category (multiple choices were possible). Of
the various types of training listed, 39 police departments (87%) participated in activeshooter training in empty schools. This training is helpful for familiarization with
response tactics and acclimation to the interior of schools. When police officers become
familiar with the areas they may need to respond to in a crisis situation they may perform
better under stressful conditions in those settings. The number of responses shows that,
on average, responding police departments participated in 2.8 types of training.
Table 7
Training Exercises Participated in by Bergen County Police Departments for ActiveShooter Training (N = 45) Multiple Choices Possible.
Type of Training
Number of Police Departments
n
%
Table TOD
15
33.
~ u l t i - ~ e ' pTable
t . Top
9
Training in Empty School
39
24
Training in School wl Actors
Multi-Dept. Training in Empty School
26
Multi-Dept. Training in School w/ Actors
15

Survey question 5 was created to learn from the responding police department
administrators, the number of police officers in their agencies who were trained to train
other police officers in active-shooter response. Table 8 reports the frequency

distribution of responses. Question 5 responses were then statistically collapsed into
logical groupings for later statistical analysis. The collapse was done using natural and
logical break points.

Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police
Number of Officers Trained
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
20
Totals

Officers in Active-Shooter Response
n
%
2
4.4
1
2.3
16
35.5
13
28.8
8
17.7
2
4.4
1
2.3
1
2.3
1
2.3
100.
45 (N)

Table 9 displays the recoded data from survey question 5. Data recoding was
done to logically develop the groupings into a low number of officers trained (0-2
officers), a medium number of officers trained (3 officers), and a high number of officers
trained (more than 3 officers) to train other police officers in active-shooter response.
-

---

Table 9
Recoded responses: Police Departments Reporting the Number of Officers Trained to
Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response
Officers Trained
n
%
Low Number of Officers Trained
19
42.
(0-2 Officers)

Medium Number of Officers Trained
(3 Officers)
Hi& Number of Officers Trained
Total

13
45 (N)

29.
100.

Table 8 shows one outlier police agency that reported 20 police officers trained to
train other police officers, otherwise the scale of responses ranged from 0-7. Of the 45
police department administrators who responded to this question 29 (or 64%) reported
that their agencies had either 2 or 3 officers trained to train other police officers in the
active-shooter response tactics.
Survey question 6 was created to learn how often police administrators, since the
September 1,2005 training mandate, required their police officers to participate in
training for active-shooter response whether it was practice scenarios, table-top exercises
or roll-call discussions. These responses too were reported as frequencies then recoded
and re-reported in statistically collapsed groups for later statistical analyses. These
groups were also created using natural and logical break off points. Table 10 shows the
frequency distribution of responses to the amount of training that is being done for
municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As indicated in Table 10, of the 45
police department administrators that answered this survey question, 29 answered that
they required their officers to participate in training either bi-annually or yearly.
Table 10
Frequency of Active-Shooter Training Required at Police Departments in Bergen County
Training Frequency
Agencies Reporting (n)
%

Monthly
Quarterly
Bi-annually
Yearly
Never
Total

45 (N)

100.

Shown below, Table 1I reports the recoded responses from survey question 6
reported in Table 10. These responses were later used for statistical analyses.
Table 11.
Recoded responses, Amount of Required Training by Bergen County Police Departments
%
Training Frequency
Agencies Reporting (n)
Once a Quarter or Monthly
Bi-annually
Once a Year or Never
Total

Survey question 7a provided information on whether or not police departments
had adopted the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Standardization of Patrol
Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy and the reasons which led to
the adoption. Table 12 lists the responses provided by agencies that did adopt the model
policy.
Reoccurring themes developed from the responses provided for why agencies did
adopt the model policy were either standardization, or having all police officers in the
county being trained in the same tactics. Table 13 displays (question 7h responses) the
reasons police administrators indicated why they did nor elect to implement the BCPO
policy as written.

Table 12
(7a) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for Adopting the BCPO Model Policy
Res~onses
n
Response checked but no comment added
Added agency specific material
Adopted their policies and created additional policies
All
All officers on same page
Allowed numerous agencies to utilize the response procedures with generic
roles for each officer
Already studied and used
Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) policy was sufficient for our needs
Consistency through out area agencies
Everyone then operates the same
Felt BCPO policy worked best for our agency
Good S.O.P.
Helped develop the plan
It was deemed sufficient and appropriate
It was our intent to remain consistent with the agencies in Bergen County
It was very similar to our original policy and would prevent conflict
Policy fit our needs and was crafted by Bergen County Police Chiefs Association
Policy was a good fit for our department
Presumably much time and effort and input was acquired to make the policy one
of the best possible
Standard through the county
Standardization
Standardization with other agencies we would expect to work with
Standardized policy with contiguous police departments
The model policy allows us to be on same page as surrounding departments
The policy fit our requirements with minor modifications
To best conform with BCPO
To conform to standardized countywide training, realizing mutual aid would be
necessary
To maintain uniformity with surrounding jurisdictions and county police
Took model and modified it to meet needs of our jurisdiction
We have the same training and procedures of the other agencies responding
We will provide the minimum mandated training to comply with the BCPO
directives
Total

32

Table 13

(7b)Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for not Adopting the BCPO Model Policy
Responses

n

Response checked but no comment listed
BCPO policy allows for 3 person teams, we mandate minimum of 4 person teams
BCPO policy and added National Tactical Officers Assoc. (NTOA) techniques
Created from other agencies models but similar to BCPO policy
Formulated to borough schools, used several parts of BCPO policy
Had a similar policy in place
Had standard NTOA policy in effect prior to BCPO policy
In effect prior to BCPO mandate, covers all relevant training equipment etc.. .
To better our own immediate needs
To conform to the department size and availability
Total

10

Although the responses in Table 13 were provided as reasons why agencies did not adopt
the model policy, most respondents indicated their original policy was as least similar to
the BCPO model policy or they used parts of the model policy to form their own.
Survey question 8 was developed to learn the number of sworn, full-time police
officers in the police departments of Bergen County, NJ. Table 14 shows the number of
sworn police officers and the frequency of agencies reporting that number of personnel.

Table 14
Number and Frequency of Police Oflcers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen
County, NJ.
Police Officers
n
%
12
2
4.5
13
4
8.9
15
3
6.7
16
1
2.2
17
1
2.2
18
5
11.1
20
4
8.9
21
1
2.2
22
5
11.1
24
1
2.2
26
1
2.2
28
1
2.2
31
3
6.7
32
2
4.5
37
2
4.5
43
1
2.2
44
1
2.2
45
1
2.2
46
1
2.2
48
1
2.2
50
1
2.2
63
1
2.2
65
1
2.2
109
1
2.2
Total

45 (N)

100.

Table 15 shows the responses listed in Table 14 which were derived from survey
question 8 that have been recoded for statistical analyses. Recoding was done using a
statistical collapse with natural and logical break points to create a grouping system of a
small number of police officers (1-20), medium number (21-30) and large number (31 or
more). Recoded responses were used for later statistical analyses.

Table 15

Recoded Responses: Number and Frequency of Full-Time Police Officers in Municipal
Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ.
Number of Police
n
%
-Number
(1-20 Full-time Police Officers)
Medium Number
(21-30 Full-time Police Officers)

Large Number
(3 1 or More Full-time Police Officers)
45 (N)

Total

100.

Survey question 9 provided information on the (2007) operating budgets in U S
dollars of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. Given that each of the
police departments surveyed listed a different dollar amount, only the recoded data were
reported in the current study. Original data were collapsed into low total operating
budget ($0.00 - $250,000.00), medium total ($250,000.00 - $3,000,000.00), and high

total ($3,000,001.00 or more).
Of the 45 responding police administrators 40 (89%) answered survey question 9.
Of the 40 responses, 31 (78%) of the operating budgets were in the low and medium
ranges. This represents almost 78 % of the responses. Only nine of the agencies reported
having a budget in the high range of $3,000,001.OO or more, representing approximately
22.5 % of the responses. Table 16 shows the recoded data from survey question 9.

Recoded Responses: Total (2007) Operating Budgets of Police Departments in Bergen

Total Operating Budget
($0.00 to $250,000.00)
Medium Total Operating Budget
($250,001.00 to $3,000,000.00)
H
&
& Total Operating Budget
($3,000,001.00 or more)

Total
* no response n = 5

40

100.

Survey question 10 was designed to learn the amounts in U.S. dollars that each
municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ reported in asset forfeiture funds in
the year 2007. The year 2007 was selected because it was the last complete year prior to
this study being conducted. Agency administrator who responded to this survey question
listed varying amounts that were specific to their agencies only. For that reason, the
responses were collapsed into manageable categories using natural and logical break
points.
The categories used were low forfeiture program ($0.00 - $200.00), medium
forfeiture program.($201 .OO - $10,000.00) and high forfeiture program ($10,000.00 or
more). Table 17 shows the response to survey question 10. Of the 45 responding
agencies, 44 (98%) provided data.

Table 17

-

Recoded Resuonses: 2007 Forfeiture Proaram. Seized Funds as Reuorted bv
,Police
Departments in Bergen County, NJ
Forfeiture Category
n
%

Low Forfeiture Program
($0.00 - $200.00)

Medium Forfeiture Program
($201.00 - $10,000.00)

H
~
J
& Forfeiture Program
($10,001.00 or more)
Total

Survey question 11 was created to determine the number of calls for service that
each municipal police agency reported they had received or responded to in 2007. For
reporting purposes each of the agencies reported a different total of calls for service.
These numbers were broken into workable categories, again using a statistical collapse
based on natural and logical break off points. These new categories were low annual
service calls (0-10,000), medium annual service calls (10,001-15,000) and high annual
service calls (15,001 or more). Table 18 shows the recoded data only for responses to
survey question 1 1.

Table 18
Recoded Responses: 2007 Annual Service Calls as Reported bv Police Departments in
Service Calls

n

%

Low Annual Service Calls
(0- 10,000)
Medium Annual Service Calls
(10,001-15,000)
Annual Service Calls
(15,001 or more)
45 (N)

Total

100.

Reliability Estimates
After the completed surveys were returned to the researcher and the descriptive
statistics were derived from them, a Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a
reliability coefficient for responses to survey questions 8,9, 10 and 11. The questions
were grouped to perform the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem
(2003) single-item reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha
was .75. Cronbacb's alpha reliability estimate normally ranges between 0 and 1.
Although there actually is no lower limit to the coefficient, the closer Cronbach's Alpha
coefficient is to 1.O, the greater the internal consistency of the items in the scale (Gliem &
Gliem, 2003).
George and Mallery (2003) provided the following rules of thumb in reference to
Cronbacb's Alpha scores:

> .9 -Excellent, - > .8 - Good, - > .7 - Acceptable, - > .6

"-

- Questionable, - > .5 -Poor, and < .5 -Unacceptable" (p. 231). Thus, for the current
work, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.

Answering Research Question 1
Research question 1 asked how have training efforts changed for police
preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer
learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued
by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers
to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response
capabilities on the topic?
Descriptive statistics reported earlier in this chapter have shown that training
efforts have changed for police preparedness to respond to active-shooter situations in
schools to create safer learning environments since the September 1,2005 training
mandate, in the amount of training required by police department administrators. Of the
45 surveys returned to the researcher with survey question 6 answered, 43 (96%)
indicated that the police agency required training in active-shooter response either
monthly, quarterly, bi-annually or yearly. Only 2 of the 45 reporting agencies responded
that it was never required to train in these response tactics.
Research question l(a) asked how training efforts are exposing officers to realistic
environments. This was answered by survey question 4. Of the 45 responding police
department administrators 39 (87%) indicated that their officers had participated in
training in empty schools. This type of training is realistic as it is places officers into a
real setting and creates familiarity for the police officers for responses during emergency
conditions.
Question l(b) asked how police departments have augmented response
capabilities. Survey question 3 was designed to answer this question. It was learned that

42 of the 45 responding police department administrators indicated that their agency had
purchased ballistic shields to augment their officers' response to a critical incident of this
sort. Thirty six of the 45 responding agencies reported their agencies had purchased
carbine or patrol rifles to further enhance response capabilities. At a reduced percentage
agencies reported purchasing other equipment items such as; ballistic helmets, battering

,

rams, bolt cutters, Hallagan or pry bars, and sledge hammers.
Answering Research Question 2
Research question 2 was also answered using descriptive statistics. The question
asked why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization
of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? This question was

answered by responses to survey question 7. Reoccurring themes developed from the
responses showed why agencies adopted the model policy: (a) standardization or (b)
having all police officers trained in the same tactics. It is apparent that police department
administrators are aware of the importance of having standard practices that all officers
can be taught. The reality of a critical incident is that neighboring jurisdictions will also
respond to supplement the response capability of the municipality suffering the crisis.
The additional responding officers need to know the same fundamental tactics the
officers in the jurisdiction in crisis know. In this respect police officers from various
municipalities can form ad hoc teams to respond to the crisis appropriately.
Reasons stated for not adopting the model policy as distributed were that police
departments already had a similar policy in place prior to the distribution of the model
policy. Other agencies created similar policies that were more specifically tailored to the

need of their specific jurisdiction. And lastly others stated they used parts of the model
policy to develop their own policy.
Answering Research Question 3
To answer research question 3 the researcher used Chi-square ( ~ 2 statistical
)
analyses to determine which factors account for the variability in the number of police
officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training
being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools (see Appendix

F).
After recoding all data in the responses to survey questions 8,9, 10, and 11 into
three categories, those responses were independent variables for Chi-square ( ~ 2 )
statistical analyses. The responses to survey questions 5 and 6 were also recoded to
provide the researcher with dependant variables for analysis. According to Witte and
Witte (2004) an independent variable is manipulated by the investigator, and a dependant
variable is measured, counted, or recorded by the investigator.

In the first statistical analysis completed, the number of sworn full time police
officers was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to
train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-square (;O)
statistical analysis results indicated a value of 2.47 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,650
(no statistical significance). In other words, the number of full-time sworn police officers
in a municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect
on the number of police officers in the agency that are trained to train other police
officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the second statistical analysis completed, the total operating budget of a police
department was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained
to train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. A Chi-square ( ~ 2 )
statistical analysis indicated a value of 2.72 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,604 (no
statistical significance). Results show that the total operating budget of a municipal
police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect on the number
of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the third statistical analysis completed, the number in U.S. dollars in forfeiture
funds reported from municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ for the year
2007 was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to
train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a dependant
variable. The Chi-square (@) statistical analysis results were statistically significant,
unlike the other two analyses. Results indicated a value of 17.68 (df = 4) and a p value of
(sig.) ,001. In much social science research, statistical significance is indicated at p I .05,
so .001 indicates statistical significance (Witte & Witte, 2004).
It appears that the amount of dollars reported by the police agencies in asset
forfeiture influences the number of police officers the agency has trained to train other
police in active-shooter response tactics: This seized money seems to be used for
additional police training. As is normally the case in asset forfeiture at the municipal
police level, seized money is maintained in an account by the county prosecutor's office
for approved usage by the municipal police department. This money can be approved by
the county prosecutor's office to be allocated for items and expenditures outside the
normal operating budget of the agency. Training typically falls under this realm. Based

on this finding one can assume that training in municipal police departments may he paid
for by seized forfeiture funds.

In the fourth statistical analysis completed, the number of annual service calls for
the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the number of police officers
trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a
dependant variable. Chi-square ( ~ 2 statistical
)
analysis results indicated a value of ,868
(df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,929 (no statistical significance). The number of calls for
service in 2007 had no effect on the number of police officers trained to train other police
officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the fifth statistical analysis, the number of sworn full-time police officers was
used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter
tactics was used as the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2 statistical
)
analysis
indicated a value of 7.38 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,117 (no statistical significance).
The p value indicated a lack of statistical significance. The number of full-time sworn
police officers had no effect on the amount of required training in active-shooter response
tactics.
In the sixth statistical analysis, the total operating budget of a police department
was used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter
tactics was used for the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2statistical
)
analysis
indicated a value of 11.95 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,018 which was statistically
significant. Again, the result of the statistical analysis is showing a relationship between
available money and training. There appears to be a relationship between the total

operating budget and the amount of training being done by police officers in activeshooter response tactics in Bergen County, NJ.

In the seventh statistical analysis, the amount of dollars reported by the police
agencies in asset forfeiture was used as the independent variable and the amount of
required training in active-shooter tactics used for the dependent variable. The ChiSquare ( ~ 2statistical
)
analysis indicated a value of 5.36 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,252
(no statistical significance). The statistical analysis showed that there is no relationship
between the amount of dollars in forfeiture funds reported and the amount of required
training in active-shooter response tactics.
In the eighth and final statistical analysis, the number of calls for service reported
for the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the amount of required
training in active-shooter response tactics was used as the dependant variable. The ChiSquare ( ~ 2statistical
)
analysis indicated a value of 8.93 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,063
(no statistical significance). However, the p value being within ,013 of an indication of
statistical significance does warrant some explanation. It appeared that although there is
not a statistically significant relationship between the number of calls for service reported
by police officers and the amount of active-shooter tactics training being required it does
seem that a relationship on some level does exist. The number of calls for service does
seem to have a relationship at some level to the amount of training being done. Busier
police departments are going to be less available to do as much training as those that are
not as busy. If the number of calls for service is greater in one agency, their officers are
needed to respond to calls for service and would be unable to become unavailable to
participate in training.

Summary

In Chapter IV, the researcher used several sections such as an introduction,
collection of data, data and findings, descriptive statistics, reliability, answering research
question 1, answering research question 2, answering research question 3 to present
information. The reported descriptive statistics learned from the survey instrument that
had been distributed to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ
presented an interesting look at the types of equipment purchases, training being done
and policy changes made as a result of the distribution of the model policy discussed
throughout.
)
analyses done to
The researcher also reported on the Chi-square ( ~ 2 statistical

determine any relationships between the indicated dependant and independent variables
of this study. Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first
was between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments
and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter
response tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the
total operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the
amount of training being done in active-shooter response tactics.
Chapter V will include an introduction, summary of findings, discussion,
conclusions, recommendations for policies and practices, and future study.

Chapter V
INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND FUTURE STUDY
Introduction
This study was developed from the personal interest of the researcher in police
tactics to respond to active-shooter situations. In beginning the study, the researcher
determined that the focus would be on municipal police departments of Bergen County,
NJ. In 2008 the researcher was a police supervisor in a municipal police department in
Bergen County and in this capacity was responsible to train other police officers in these
tactics.
The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County
Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations
of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter
situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is
mandatory for the children to age 16 in Bergen County, New Jersey the municipal police
departments of the county must provide a safe learning environment while children are in
attendance.
The researcher sought a suitable survey instrument designed to gather appropriate
information to answer the research questions at the foundation of the study. These
research questions were:
1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to
active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office (BCPO)? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments?
(b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy?
3 . What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers

designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being
done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
The researcher located the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics (USDOJ), Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(LEMAS) survey instrument. With permission from the USDOJ, the LEMAS survey
instrument was amended and the questions specifically tailored for the needs of the
current study. A revised survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of
experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous
flow of dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts. The survey instrument
consisted of 11 questions and was redistributed as a pilot study for feedback, as was
reported in chapter 111 in greater detail. After the determination that the final 11 question
survey was to be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed to all of the
municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. The mailing took place on
December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of solicitation it was requested that the
voluntary participants return the survey to the researcher by January 7,2009. Through
the use of the survey the guiding questions were then answered in chapter IV.

Summary of Findings
The descriptive statistics from the present study developed a picture of what has
been done by police agencies in Bergen County to prepare for an active-shooter event in
a school. Prior to the distribution of the model policy more than 50% of the police
departments in Bergen County did not have any type of plan in effect for dealing with
this type of crisis in a school. This policy then forced the remaining police agencies to
either adopt the distributed model policy or develop their own plan for implementation.
Through this study it was also learned that 86% of the agencies that already had
response plans prior to the distribution of the model policy, had also included a mutual
aid plan to get assistance from neighboring jurisdictions when the crisis occurred. This is
a clear example of forward thinking on the part of the administrators.
In addition, the respondent police agencies also understood the importance of
radio communications interoperability with the neighboring jurisdictions. This was
evidenced by 93% of the police departments creating radio communications
interoperability with neighboring agencies as a result of the distributed model policy.
This allows for multiple jurisdictions to communicate with one another on the same radio
frequency to provide for faster and more direct radio communications.
This study shed light on the types of equipment police departments made as a
result of the model policy distribution. It was indicated that 93% of the agencies that
responded reported purchasing ballistic shields, 80% purchased carbine or patrol rifles,
and 76% reported purchasing ballistic helmets.

As for training, 87% of the police departments reported training in empty schools
in their jurisdictions. This creates familiarization with the interior and exterior of the
schools which could make the difference of saving a life during a crisis situation.
Sadly, only 20% of the police departments reported training as being mandatory
on a quarterly basis, 22.2% on a bi-annual basis, and still only 42% required training on a
yearly basis. This is simply not enough to get good at tactics. At best once or twice a
year can only help to refresh your tactics. It is hardly enough to make improvements and
become skilled in what is being taught and trained.
A Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a reliability coefficient for
responses to survey questions 8,9, 10 and 11. The questions were grouped to perform
the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem (2003) single-item
reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha was .75. For the
current study, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.
The following relationships were determined to be lacking statistical significance:
(a) the number of sworn full time police officers as an independent variable and the
number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable,
(b) the total operating budget of a police department as an independent variable and the
number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable,

(c) the number of annual service calls for the year 2007 as the independent variable and
the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter
response tactics as a dependant variable, (d) the number of sworn full-time police
officers as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter
tactics as the dependent variable, (e) the amount of dollars reported by the police

agencies in asset forfeiture as the independent variable and the amount of required
training in active-shooter tactics as the dependent variable, and (f) the number of calls for
service reported for the year 2007 as the independent variable and the amount of required
training in active-shooter response tactics as the dependant variable.
The present study also determined two statistically significant findings. The first
of these findings was the relationship between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by
municipal police departments in 2007 and the number of police officers trained to train
other police officers in active-shooter response tactics. Based on results from this
research, the more seizure funds available to police department administrators the more
police officers in their agencies are being trained to train the other police officers in their
respective police departments in active-shooter response tactics.
The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total
operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount
of training being done in active-shooter response tactics. Both findings indicate that there
is a direct relationship between available finances and training of police officers in
active-shooter response tactics. Simply put, police departments with larger budgets and
more available money are training more often than agencies with smaller budgets and
less money available. Therefore the assumption can be made that the more money
allocated toward training will better prepare police officers to be able to respond to and
effectively deal with an active-shooter situation in a school.

Discussion
If Ouchi (1977) is correct in the assumption that structure influences behavior, the
conclusion can be made that more training designed to train police officers to respond to
active-shooter situations will create better prepared police. Mintzberg's (1979) theory of
action planning accounts for how a job is done rather than specifically relying on the
outcome of the operation. With this theory in mind the assertion can be made that when
more police officers are designated to train others in essential response tactics then the
responding police should be more likely to he successful in the completion of their
mission, which is to save lives.
Scanlon (2001) described the premise of an active-shooter, who is seriously
wounding andlor killing people, and the need for the first responding officers to make a
rapid assessment of the incident and make entry to stop the suspect[s]. This ability to
rapidly assess and form an ad hoc team is essential to properly ending these types of
crisis situations. However, police departments in Bergen County are not devoting enough
time, energy and resources to training toward this end and if the time comes when the
tactics are needed there will be a break down in their capability to bring the situation to a
quick resolution. There needs to be more frequent training.
Giduck (2005) recommended that police try to change their rnindset from police
officer dealing with a crime scene to a military unit dealing with a battlefield. If 42% of
police departments are training but once a year in the necessary skills and tactics it would
likely be an impossible task to effectively train to appropriately handle these situations as
they may arise. Training once a year serves the officers more as a reminder of tactics
rather than a training of learned skills. Training is a repetitive process where skills are

ingrained through repetition, practice, critique, and correction. Once a year is simply not
enough for officers to become efficient in the necessary skills they will need to possess to
work safely and swiftly to bring a conflict of this nature to an end.
Lloyd (2000) called it a moral obligation for police to make entry and intervene in
an ongoing active-shooter situation. The purchases described in this study of tactical and
entry equipment displays the commitment of Bergen County Police Departments toward
this end. The entry equipment purchased offers the police the ability to make a forced
entry to breach any location to quickly gain access and begin their mission. The tactical
equipment is a testament to properly equipping the officers that will most certainly be
placed in harms way to complete their mission. Although there is no specific
recommendation on equipment purchases the more tools at the disposal of the police
officers the easier it will be to do their job.
Coordination and control as presented by Bolman and Deal (2003) helps to ensure
that diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh. This theory is the premise behind
having a unified response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents.
Through the use of structure, police officers from various agencies are able to work
safely and effectively together. This goal is met by the establishment of the
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy
distributed by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. It seemed to be a priority of the
police administrators when they indicated reasons why they adopted the model policy,
that all police officers are aware of the same basic tactics. The reality is that multiple
jurisdictions will respond to the same scene to assist in bringing the crisis to a resolution.

This can be done by training all police officers who may respond in the same tactics so
each can work with any other.
Conclusions
It seems clear to the researcher that the police administrators that provided
answers to the distributed survey questionnaire at the foundation of this study are quite
aware of what needs to be done in the event of an active-shooter situation in a school of
their jurisdiction. What seems to be lost is that these tactics when initially trained are
perishable skills, and like anything else that is taught, it will go away when not properly
reinforced. What is lacking in Bergen County is the correct measure of reinforcement of
the tactics. Police officers are simply not training enough to become really prepared and
efficient at the necessary skill sets to tackle the situations which have formed the basis of
this study.
Numerous documents have been written based on research conducted on who
commits these violent acts in our nation's schools. Klein (2005) asserted that popular
discourse addressed school shootings almost obsessively, but continued to omit the role
gender plays in these crimes. New research has suggested that this omission was
ignoring a key element: a significant number of the boys' own stated reasons for this
violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence specifically involving girls (Klein,
2005). This researcher has found that aside from a rare exception or two, predominately
young white males from the ages 11 - 18 years old, mostly loners and with relatively
easy access to firearms are the perpetrators (Scanlon, 2001). With the type of
information collected by agencies like the FBI in their July, 1999 paper entitled "The
school shooter: a threat assessment perspective" (O'Toole, 1999) and the International

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in their "Guide for Preventing and Responding to
School Violence" retrieved from the IACP website in February 2007 (Kramen, Massey,
& Timm, 1999), school officials have been preparing for violent students, with the

assistance of their law enforcement partners. Identification of the potential offenders is
the first step toward limiting this kind of behavior in the future. Prevention can come
from close partnerships between law enforcement and schools in early detection of
potential assaults as well as in sharing information about those identified as having the
potential to be involved in this behavior. Sending better prepared police to respond to
these crisis situations in the schools is a direct result of the amount of money that is being
allotted for training.

'

For law enforcement personnel to take their tactics to the next level, they must
begin now to prepare for future acts of school violence and/or terrorism. As a result of
this research project the researcher now knows that the amount of funds allocated toward
training is going to make the difference in sending better prepared police officers into a
potential battle. No one thought it would have been possible for the acts of September
11,2001 to have been perpetrated against the US, on US soil. After the events of
911 112001 occurred, the law enforcement community was left with the realization that the
US was no longer immune from the acts of violence the rest of the world has had to
endure for centuries. Future acts of active shooting in schools and terrorism are a reality
and police officers must be prepared to face them.
Just as the law enforcement community has learned lessons from the Columbine
High School tragedy, so too have the next wave of potential attackers and terrorists been
planning their next attack. Through after action investigations, it is known that school

attackers and terrorists study police responses and know all about tactics the likes of
active-shooter, QUAD, and IARD that have been discussed herein. US law enforcement
must begin now to prepare for potential attacks by active-shooters and terrorists on our
most precious targets, our children (Giduck, 2005). What could make American citizens
feel more vulnerable than an attack at a school? Persons in other countries have been
dealing with this reality for years and are prepared to handle situations like this at a
school. Countries like Israel have placed armed guards on every school bus and in every
school. School buses are armored to minimize potential injuries from an attack. School
campuses are fortified territory (Giduck, 2005). Short of having armed guards on
armored school buses and inside schools, more must be done to train police in response
tactics. To accomplish this goal more money must be directed toward the training of
tactics like those proposed in the Standardization of Patrol Based Response for ActiveShooter Situations.
Law enforcement policy makers need also to begin cooperative efforts with
military units for training in handling battlefield type conflict, much like they would be
facing in a terrorist attack on a school. Terrorism experts like Giduck who authored
"Terror at Beslan" (2005) conclude that the terrorists will attack the US again. It is also
likely that a potential target will be an unsuspecting school. The terrorists are not at all
like the loner child who brings a gun to school. They come with tested and rehearsed
battle plans, reinforcements, surveillance and counter surveillance measures in place
(Giduck, 2005).
The terrorist's goal is not to he arrested or contained; it is to kill as many victims
and police responders as possible to gain notoriety for their cause (Giduck, 2005). Our

future is now: Policing in the US must adapt now for the threats of the future which will
most certainly be at the hands of terrorists who will, like they have in the past, attack
when and where we are least expecting them to. That certainly could be a school. Law
enforcement personnel need to make more adaptations to their training now to be able to
respond to an event they will face (Giduck, 2005). With one hurdle cleared the next one
is right in front of us.
Recommendations for Policies and Practices
Since police officers may face the need to respond to a critical incident (activeshooter situation) in the schools of their jurisdictions, the responsibility for training in
response tactics becomes increasingly paramount. In that respect all responding police
officers to an active-shooter situation, must at least be aware of the same tactics. In
Bergen County, NJ this topic was addressed in 2005 when the prosecutor's office
distributed a memo requiring a unified and consistent active-shooter response.
However, this researcher believes that more needs to be done than just blanket
familiarization with a response policy. As was discovered in this research there is
disparity in the amount and type of training being done. Not enough training is taking
place to respond effectively to an active-shooter situation. More training needs to
become the rule rather than the exception. If not enough training is being conducted, the
training and interest will not be sustained. When times get really tough, in a critical
situation the natural tendency is to revert to the original process of how things were done
in the past (Palazzolo, 2009). Here, how thing3 were done in the past simply will not be
enough to save lives effectively.

Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy
and some situations only now have begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of
information available on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a).
The researcher located no research to determine what the best tactics are to respond to
active-shooters in schools and the science of the study police tactics. Since no data are
available to study to make a truly scientific determination to apply to policy the advice of
the experts like Giduck must be followed. More training is certainly necessary to provide
the community with a prepared and capable police department.
Based on the findings of this study more money and effort needs to be directed
toward training budgets. Police departments with more funds available are doing more
training. Since the critical incidents that may present themselves are not specific to
jurisdictions with sufficient training budgets, funds must come from somewhere to
prepare police to respond to crisis situations. If police departments are unable to fund
their own training, a county-wide or state-wide training program should be available to
police departments for continuous training.
The Bergen County Prosecutor's Office should establish and maintain a countywide training division. One responsibility for this training division should be providing
standard and mandatory continuing training to the police in the county in mutual aid and
critical incident responses. The training should be provided at not cost to the local police
departments of the county to ensure cost to the agency is not preventing officers from
being trained in the most current tactics available.

Future Study
Numerous research projects and studies have been conducted on the topic of
school violence prevention. But what happens when it happens? What about when the
prevention efforts are not effective to stop the violence before it happens? There needs to
be research on the best practices of police response tactics to school shooter situations.
Special attention needs to be paid to the evolution of tactics and how they are changing
based on prior responses and the successfulness of the police operations in those
incidents. To accomplish this S.W.A.T. tactics should be studied to determine which, is
the best fit to adapt to train to patrol officers.
More research needs to be done in the topic area of police training and the amount
of funds required for that training to be successful. A comprehensive study needs to be
conducted to determine the dollar amount that needs to be allocated per police officer to
allow for similarly trained police in effective tactics. An in depth study should be
focused on tactical equipment and which pieces are best for police to use during crisis
situations.
There should be future studies done to determine what police officers in other
counties in New Jersey are doing to prepare for these types of situations they may face in
schools. There should also be a study done to compare what is being done from state to
state and as a result try to determine which training is the most cost effective, the most
beneficial and which fits best for patrol officers.
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BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
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All Bergen Cwnty ChiPC(
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Dirarthr W01 Active Shooter PnEey ln*irtive
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cc:

CblCf M k b U l MWdrgt

Btm Aasirtant Prw~rsculorWllhm J. Gads
ExccatCve AI~irtaotProuccuior Frank Pucdo

Appendix B

List of 68 Bergen County Municipal Police Departments
Agency
Allendale
Alpine
Bergenfield
Bogota
Carlstadt
Cliffside Park
Closter
Cresskill
Demarest
Dumont
East Rutherford
Edgewater
Elmwood Park
Emerson
Englewood
Englewood Cliffs
Fair Lawn
Fairview
Fort Lee
Franklin Lakes
Garfield
Glen Rock
Hackensack
Harrington Park
Hasbrouck Heights
Haworth
Hillsdale
Ho-Ho-Kus
Leonia
Little Ferry
Lodi
Lyndhurst
Mahwah
Maywood
Midland Park
~ontvile
Moonachie
New Milford
North Arlington
Northvale

Number of officers

Agency

Number of officers

Nonvood
Oakland
Old Tappan
Oradell
Palisades Park
Paramus
Park Ridge
Ramsey
Ridgefield
Ridgefield Park
Ridgewood
River Edge
River Vale
Rochelle Park
Rutherford
Saddle Brook
Saddle River
South Hackensack
Teaneck
Tenafly
Upper Saddle River
Waldwick
Wallington
Washington Township
Westwood
Wood-Ridge
Woodcliff Lake
Wyckoff

Appendix C

Jell'Ditm
1 ! 7 Knolls Road

Dear Mr. Dino:
'The purpose of this letter is to p n t you pmission to use o limited numbcr of questk
from the BJS Law Enforcement Maaagement and Administrative Slatistics (I FMAS)
survey qwauonuairr firr your study of policc dcpenments in Bcrgsn County. Ncw Jer
This pwnissinn is yranlcd fnr the purposcs of rile R q e n Cuunty data collectiuu only
and any future &la cullecrions basal un thz I.EMAS survcy instnrrnenl will also requ
a request to BJS for permission lo use the I.EMAS questions. If any liihcr infnrmali
is needed reganling this letter ol'prtuiasion, please contact me by email at
.-%tiru~.reave%Nsdqj.~;-or by phone at 202-616-3287.

1 EMAS Program hfanagcr

Bureau of histice Statislics
I1.S. Damanem of Jumice

September l5.20U8
John L. Molinelli. Prnsecutor
k r y e n County P m s ~ u t o r ' sO l l i ~
10 Main Skeet
Ilackensack, SJ 07601
Dear Prosecutor Molinelli.

My name is Jeiftcy D i m I mn a 1 ;year veteran Police w e a n 1 with thc
Mahwah Police Deportment. I .m alsn a &xlciral d d a t c a1 Seton H ~ l IInivmiQ'.
l
1
nm paporing my dissertation on police p~panulncssto rcspond to active shooter
situntions in schwls 01'Uergen County,N. Thc dissertation is focl~wdon how thc
municipl pulice duparuncnts of Hergen County are preparing to respond lo an activc
shouler situation siucc tlw distribution of your directive marked 05-01 Actiw Shootcr
Policy Initintive.
The p w p c of this ietkr is lo rqucsl your pcnnission for me tn send each of the
68 municipal police agcncics of Bergen County n copy of a survey qurstio&
lo ask
hem lo complclc and rcturn tn me. The s w e y contains qwlionu borrowed hm the
L.sw Enfnrcemcnt Management and ~UminislrruivrStatistics survey and qucstion~thmt
were prepared with the assistwe of a jury ol'cxprts in the fields of policing police
tactics. and emergency mamgemenl.
I'hiu rlscarch study has k e n approved by Seton I I d University. All information
gatherd will be kept strictly confidential and no identifying characteristics of any ngency
will be asked for or dissemi~tcd.
I ~vouldlike lo lake 1h1s opportunity to thank you for my and dl considwdliun
you give this request. If h r c arc any questions I can he c n n k k d mytine at 973650IlZh5.

L MOIIN~UI
Cuvnh Promulor

Office of the County Prosecutor
County of Bergen
HACKENSACK.NEW JERSEY 07601
(201) 646-1300

Jolw L. Hmwh

UI

Tnsl L h ~ t

Joseph Macellam
Chmt orlktallvn

October 8.2008
Mr. J e f h y Din0
1 17 Knolls Road
Bloomingdale, NJ 07403

Re: Active Shooter Preparedness Survey
Dear Mr. Dino,

In regard to your request to send a questionnaire to the municipal police departments in
Bergen County to assess how the departments are prepared to respond to an active shooter
situation. that request, and the form proposed by you are approved. It is my understanding that
you are sending out this questionnaire in furtherance of your doctoral degree at Seton Hall
University. This office approves of the questionnaire that you wish to use, and also is interested
in the results that will flow from the responses that you receive. Please provide this office with a
summary of your tindings, if possible. I commend you on yow choice of topic, and wish you
much success in your efforts to achieve your doctoral degree. If at any time I, or this office, can
be of any further assistance to you please do not hesitate to contact me at 201 -226-5104.

William J. Galda
First Assistant Prosecutor

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF RESEARCH, DEMONSTRATIONOR
RELATED ACTIVITIES INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

A ShdV in Police hemredness to Resoond to Active Shooter Situationsto
Provide a Safer Lea& Environment in tbe Schools of Bernen Countv. New Jmev.

PROJECT TITLE:

f h G,Lh&

Dr. C n a b millerr
L
RESEARCHER'S ADVISOR ORDEPARTMENTAL SUPERVISOR

1Please pint or type out name below -lure^

DIRECTOR. 0
SETON W UNlVERSlN INSTINTICt+U
R M E W BOARD FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH

1011W
DATE

December 17,2008
Jefiky Dino
117 Knolls Road
Bloomingdale, NJ 07403
Dear Mr. Dino,
The Seton Hall University lnstitutional Review Board has reviewed the information you
have submitted addressing the concerns for your proposal entitled "A Study in Police
Preparedness to Report to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning
Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey". Your research protocol is
hereby approved as revlsed thmugh expedited review. The 1RB reserves the right to
recall the proposal at any time for full review.
Enclosed for your records are the signed Request for Approval form, and the stamped
Letter of Solicitation. Make copies only of this stamped letter.
The Institutional Review Board approval of your research is valid for a one-year period
from the date of this letter. Durina this time. any changes to the research ~rotocolmust
be reviewed and a~orovedhv the IRB ~ r i o to
r their imdementation.
Accodmg to federal regulations, continuing review of already approved research is
mandated to take place at least 12 months after this initial approval. You will receive
communication from the TRB Office for this several months before the anniversary date
of your initial approval.
Thank you for your cooperation.
In harmony withfederal regulations. none of the investigators or research stoffinvolved
in the study rookpurr in thejinol decision

Sincerely,

~rciessor
Director, Institutional Review Board
cc:

Dr. Charles Achilles
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Appendix E

UNIVERSITY

SETON HALL
I

.

B

.

December 18,2CfJ8

Dear Chief,
MYname is Jefiev Dino and I am a Sergeant of Police with the Mahwah Police
a dissertation at Seton Hall
~epartmeit.I am also a doctoral candidate
University. My study is on Active Shooter preparedness by municipal police
denanments in Bemen Countv.. NJ. The ournose of this letter is to ask for Your assistance
with this project.
My request is for you to please spare a few minutes out of your day to complete
the attached survey and mail it back to me by January 7,2008. The survey contains 11
questions that should not take very much of your time. I can assure you that no part of
this survev will be seen bv anvone other than me and mv dissertation committee.
68 munlctpal police
~ i c the
r dam 1s c o ~ ~ from
~ ~ all
c panwpantr
d
depanmcnts in Bcrgen Counlyl. the surveys wlll be stored in a locked fire res~slantbox in
my home for three years as iscustomary in doctoral research. Further, all surveys will be
coded with a control number and your agency name will not appear anywhere on the
survey. These layers of security are to ensure your anonmitv and reassure vou that vour
answers to the questions in the survey will be kept private and confidential.
After you complete the survey, please mail it back to me using
.the self addressed
stamped envelope provided with the survey.
This shldy has been approved by Seton Hall University's Institutional Review
Board (IRB) and bv the Berren CountvProsecutors Office. If vou have anv auestions
about the survey or about any of the questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at
973-650-0565 or my mentor Dr. Charles Achilles 973-761-9668. If you have any
questions about subject's rights in this research please contact Dr. ~"zickaat the-RB at
973-313-6314.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation in my academic endeavor.

-

.

.

.

&I

. .

..

-

Respectfully

A, 11

Jeffrey T. Dino

Seton Hall UnhremHy
InsliMional Review Board

3EC 17 2008
Approval Date

MDate
OEC 17 mrJ

Appendix F

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid

N

Q8R ' Q5R
Q9R " Q5R
Q10R Q5R
QllR'Q5R

Percent

45
40
44
45

Total

Missing

N

66.2%
58.8%
64.7%
66.2%

N

Percent

23
28
24
23

33.8%
41.2%
35.3%
33.8%

Percent

68
68
68
68

100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Crosstab
Medium
Low Number
Number of
of Trained
Trained
Officers in
Officers in
Active Shooter Active Shooter
Response (0
Response (3
Officers)
2 Officers)
Count
I
9 1
5
~
~count ~
t
~
d
5.8
% of Total
20.0%
11.1%
.2
-3
Std. Residual
Count
I
5 1
3
Expected Count
3.8
2.6
% of Total
11.1%
6.7%

-

28R

Small Organization (1 20 ~ull-time
Authorized
Positions)

-

Medium Oraanization
(21-30 Full-time
Authorized Positions)
Large Organization
(More than 30 Full-time
Authorized Positions)

I

I

Std. Residual
Count
~
~count ~
% of Total
Std. Residual

rota1

Count
Expected Count
9h of Total

(

.6
~

~

~

5
6.8 t

~

High Number
of Trained
Officers in
4ct1veShooter
Response
(More than 3
Officers)
6
5.8
13.3%
.1
1
2.6
2.2%
.2
-1.0
~5
6
4.6 d
4.6

11.1%

11.1%

-.7

.2

.6

19
19.0
42.2%

13
13.0
28.9%

13
13.0
28.9%

13.3%

Total
20
20.0
44.4%
9
9.0
20.0%
16
16.0
35.6%

45
45.0
100.0%

Chi-square Tests

I

Pearson Chi-square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
2.473a
2.753
,475

I

45

4
4

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
,650
,600

1

,490

df

1

1

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.60.

Medium
Number of
Trained
Officers in
Wive Shooter
Response (3
Officers)

High Number
of Trained
Officers in
4C1ive Shooter
Response
(More than 3
Officers)
3
4.8
7.5%
-.8
4
3.0
10.0%
.6
3
2.3

19
19.0
47.5%

10.0%
-.6
3
4.1

5
5.7
12.5%
-.3
4
3.6
10.0%
.2
3
2.7

7.5%

7.5%

7.5%

22.5%

.2

.5

12
12.0
30.0%

10
10.0
25.0%

Low Number
of Trained
Officers in
Active Shooter
Res~onse10 2 Office;)
29R

Low Total Operating
Budget ($0 - $250,000)

Count
Expected Count
% of Total
Std. Residual
MediumTotal O~erating Count
Expected Count
Budget (5250bol $3,000,000)
% of Total
High Total Operating
Budget (More than
$3,000,000)

Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
% of Total

11
8.6

I

I

27.5%
.8
4
5.4

Std. Residual
rota1

Count
Expected Count
% of Total

18.0
45.0%

Total

12
12.0
30.0%
9
9.0

40
40.0
100.0%

Chi-square Tests

'Pearson

Value
2.729"

Chi-square

Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association

N of Valid Cases

II

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
,604

df
4

2.777

4

2.086

1

.I49

596

40

a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.25.

II

Crosstab

210R

Low Forfeiture Program 2007 ($0 - $200)

Medium Forfeiture
Program - 2007 ($201 $10,000)
High Forfeiture Program 2007 (More than $10,000)

rotai

Low Number
of Trained
Officers in
Active Shooter
Res~onse10 2 officers)
Count
10
Expected Count
7.3
Total
22.7%
1.O
Std. Residual
count
4
Expected Count
5.6
%of Total
9.1%
Std. Residual
- .7
5
Count
Expected Count
6.0
% of Total
11.4%
Std. Residual
-.4
count
I
19
Expected Count
%of Total
43.2%
19'0

%if

I

I

I

1

I

1

I

1

I

Q5R
High Number
Medium
Number of
of Trained
Officers in
Trained
Active Shooter
Officers in
Response
Active Shooter
(More than 3
Res~onse(3
&cers)
officers)
5
2
4.6
5.0
4.5%
11.4%
.2
-1.3
9
0
3.5
3.8
20.5%
.O%
-1.9
2.6
2
7
4.1
3.8
15.9%
4.5%
1.6
-1 .I
13 1
12
12.0
29.5%
27.3%

I

1

1

Total
17
17.0
38.6%

13
13.0
29.5%

14
14.0
31.8%

44
44.0
100.0%

-

Chi-square Tests

Pearson Chi-square

I
I
1

Likelihood Ratio

1

Linear-by-Linear
Association

(

N of Valid Cases

I

value
17.685a
19.551
1

I
I

1

I ~ s y m pSig.
.
I
I (2-sided)

df

1

4

(

,001

4

1

,001

.

1 1

I

1591

I

44

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 3.55.

Q11R * QSR
Crosstab
I

1
31IR

Low Annual Service
Calls - 2007 ( 0 - 10,000)

Medium Annual Service
Calls - 2007 (10,001 15,000)

count
Ex~ected
Count
%of Total
Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
% of Total

Hiah Annual Service
~ a i i -s2007 ( More than
15,000)

Std. Residual
count
Eqected Count
% of Total
Std. Residual

rota1

count
Expected Count
% of Total

Low Number
of Trained
Officers in
Active Shooter
Res~onse10 2 office&)
10
8.9
22.2%

I

8.9%

1
I

I

Number of
Trained

of Trained
Officers in

Officers

Officers

Total
21
21.o
46.7%
12
12.0
26.7%

-5
5
5.1

12
12.0

11.1%

26.7%

42.2%

45
45.0
100.0%

Chi-square Tests
-

Pearson Chi-square

1 Likelihood Ratio

I

Value
.86ea (
,883

I

1

1

I

Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

3 5

I

1

df
4
4
1

(

1

I

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
,929
,927
5i2

45
a. 4 cells (44.4%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 3.47.

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary
Valid

N
Q8R " Q6R
Q9R * Q6R
Q1OR " Q6R
QllR'Q6R

45
40
44
45

Percent
66.2%
58.8%
64.7%
66.2%

Cases
Missing
Percent
N
33.8%
23
41.2%
28
35.3%
24
23
33.8%

Total

N
68
68
68
68

Percent
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Crosstab

I

I
Q8R

Small Organization (1 20 Full-time Authorized
Positions)

Count
Expected count
% of Total
Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
Total

Medium Organization
(21-30 Full-time
Authorized Positions)
Large Organization
(More than 30 Full-time
Authorized Positions)

Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count

Once a
Quarter or
Monthly
5
6.2

I

I

11.1%
-.5
4
8

.7
5

I

I

I

Pearson Chi-square
Likelihood ~ a t i o
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

1

(

I
1

value
7.38Ba1
7.617

1

.478

1

17.8%
1.7
1
2.0
2.2%

1

-.7
1
3.6

1

-1.4

.9

14
14.0
31.1%

10
10.0
22.2%

21
21.0
46.7%

I ~ s y m pSip.
.
I

I

df

4
4

Once a year
or Never
7
9.3
15.6%
-.8
4
4.2
8.9%
-.l
10
7.5

22.2%

Count
Expected Count
% of Total

1

Bi-annually
8
4.4

.O

Chi-square Tests

I

Q6R

% of Total

Std. Residual
rota1

.

I

I

1

(2-sided)
.I17
,107

1

45

a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.00.

1

I

Total
20
20.0
44.4%

9
9.0
20.0%
16
16.0
35.6%

45
45.0
100.0%

Crosstab

(

I

1I

Q9R

Low Total Operating
Budget ($0 $250,000)

MediumTotal Operating
Budget ($250,001 $3,000,000)

Count
Expected Count
% of Total
Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
% of Total

High Total Operating
Budget (More than
$3,000,000)

Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
% of Total

-

Quarter or
Monthly

1

Bi-annually

8
5.7
20.0%
1.O
2
3.6

1

2
3.8
5.0%
-.9
6
2.4

I

Std. Residual
Total

Count
Expected Count
% of Total

5.0%
-3
2
2.7
5.0%

.O%

-.4

-1.3

12
12.0
30.0%

8
8.0
20.0%

Chi-square Tests

Pearson Chi-square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

I

I

Value
11.955a
12.269

1.811

df

(

4
4
1

I

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.018
,015

40
a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 1.80.

15.0%
2.3
0
1.8

178

I

I

Once a year
or Never
9
9.5
22.5%
-.2

Total

19
19.0
47.5%
12
12.0
30.0%
9
9.0
22.5%

40
40.0
100.0%

Crosstab

QlOR

Low Forfeiture Program
- -

2007 ($0 - $200)

Medium Forfeiture
Program - 2007 ($201 -

$10,000)

1
Count
Expected Count
% of Total
Std. Residual
Count
Expected count
% of Total

I

Quarter or
Monthly

Std. Residual
Count
High Forfeiture Program
2007 (More than $10,000) Expected Count
% of Total
Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
% of Total

-

Total

7
5.4
15.9%
.7
3
4.1
6.8%
-.6
4
4.5
9.1%
-2
14
14.0
31.6%

Chi-square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig.
(Psided)

df

5.362a
5.578

4
4

,252
,233

1.729

1

.I89

44

a. 5 cells (55.6%)have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.95.

I Bi-annually I
1

4
3.9
9.1%
.1
5
3.0
11.4%
1.2
1
32
2.3%
-1.2
10
10.0
22.7%

1

Once a vear
or ~ e b e r

1

6 1
7.7
13.6%
-.6
5
5.9
11.4%
-.4
9
6.4
20.5%
1.O
20
20.0
45.5%

Total

17
17.0
38.6%
13
13.0
29.5%
14
14.0
31.8%
44
44.0
100.0%

Crosstab

I

Q6R

Bi-annually
6
4.7
13.3%
.6
3
2.7
6.7%
.2
1
2.7

Once a year
or Never
7
9.8
15.6%
-.9
4
5.6
8.9%
-.7
10
5.6

2.2%

2.2%

22.2%

-1.4

-1.0

1.9

14
14.0
31.1%

10
10.0
22.2%

21
21.0
46.7%

Monthly
Q11R

Low Annual Service
Calls - 2007 ( 0 - 10,000)

Medium Annual Service
Calls - 2007 (10.001 15,000)

Count
Ex~eCtedCount
Total
Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
% of Total

High Annual Service
Calls - 2007 ( More than
15.000)

Std. Residual
Count
Expected Count
% of Total

%if

1

8
6.5
17.8%
.6
5
3.7
11.1%
.7
1
3.7

Std. Residual
Total

Count
Expected Count
% of Total

Chi-square Tests

Pearson Chi-square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
8.93ga
9.482
5.405

4
4

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.063
,050

1

.020

df

45

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.87.

1

Total
21
21 .o
46.7%
12
12.0
26.7%
12
12.0
26.7%

45
45.0
100.0%

